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Ecuador’s role in the cocaine trade has historically differed from its drug-
trafficking neighbors. This Andean country traditionally serves as a transshipment 
hub for illegal narcotics, precursor chemicals, and a place to launder money. 
Over the past several years, however, Ecuador appears to have become a rising 
actor in the cocaine trade. Seizures are increasing and so is the presence of 
transnational criminal organizations. Why is Ecuador now experiencing an 
increase in cocaine seizures? What factors explain this emergence? What is 
attracting transnational criminal organizations, such as the Mexican cartels, the 
Russian Mafia, and the Chinese Triads, to Ecuador? Furthermore, how has 
Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa’s administration, its policies, and its 
relationship with the United States contributed to this new dynamic? This thesis 
argues that the increased flow of cocaine through the country is what is driving 
the increase in seizures. This increase is further attributed to the ease of 
operating in Ecuador, making it a low-threat option for cocaine traffickers. 
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I. ECUADOR: A LOW-THREAT OPTION FOR COCAINE 
TRAFFICKING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ecuador is situated in the middle of the Andean region of South America, 
among nations that are notorious for their sales in the cocaine trade. The country 
and other residents in the region—Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia—share many of 
the same characteristics, including geographical environment and topography, 
geopolitics, and colonial history. Despite these similarities, however, Ecuador’s 
role in the cocaine trade has historically differed from its Andean compatriots. It 
has served mostly as a transshipment hub for illegal narcotics, precursor 
chemicals, and a place to launder money. Nevertheless, over the past several 
years, Ecuador appears to have become a rising actor in the cocaine trade. 
Seizures are increasing and so is the presence of transnational criminal 
organizations. This thesis argues that the increased flow of cocaine through the 
country is what is driving the increase in seizures. This increase is further 
attributed to the ease of operating in Ecuador, making it a low-threat option for 
cocaine traffickers. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
According to Ecuadorian Ministry of the Interior data, as of January 1, 
2015, Ecuadorian security forces have seized a record amount of illegal drugs for 
the fifth consecutive year.1 Specifically, the ministry states that from January 
2007 to June 2015, the security forces confiscated 380 tons of drugs, most of 
which was cocaine. Furthermore, 48.5 tons of cocaine was seized in the first half 
of 2015, which doubles the 2014 seizures during the same period.2 These 
                                            
1 “Ecuador Almost Duplicates Drug Seizures between 2014 and 2015,” Agencia Publica de 






seizure rates confirm Ecuador as a major player in the cocaine trade and as a 
regional hub for drug trafficking. The presence of transnational criminal 
organizations has also increased within Ecuador’s borders. This increase began 
in early 2000, with use by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army) of Ecuador’s 
northern border region as a safe haven. Organizations such as Mexico’s Sinaloa 
Cartel, the Russian Mafia, and the Chinese Triads have similarly begun to 
operate within Ecuador.3 These organizations are relying on Ecuadorian supply 
chains to transport narcotics, precursor chemicals, weapons, pharmaceuticals, 
migrants, and illicit profits in and out of the Andean region. This thesis, therefore, 
presents the following research questions: 
 Why is Ecuador now experiencing an increase in cocaine seizures? 
What factors explain this emergence?  
 What is attracting transnational criminal organizations such as the 
Mexican cartels, the Russian Mafia, and the Chinese Triads to 
Ecuador?  
 Furthermore, how has Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa’s 
administration, its policies, and its relationship with the  
United States contributed to this new dynamic?  
An analysis of Ecuador’s role in the cocaine trade can help U.S. policy 
makers gain a greater understanding of the variables that are contributing to the 
trade of illegal substances. Furthermore, it is essential to identify if or how 
domestic policies and institutions create a security gap for illicit activities to take 
place and flourish. Understanding these issues can help develop policies 
targeted at nations that are emerging as drug-trafficking actors, thus avoiding 
their emergence as power-players, or a narco-state, in the cocaine trade or other 
criminal arenas. 
                                            
3 Douglas Farah and Glenn R. Simpson, Ecuador at Risk: Drugs, Thugs, Guerrillas and the 




C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Addressing the research questions led to an investigation in the following 
areas of related literature. A key starting point was to review the literature 
regarding Ecuador’s current role in the drug trade. To augment findings on 
Ecuador’s role, the literature review also briefly addresses the evolution of 
narcotics in the Andes and how the criminalization of narcotics evolved. Other 
issues examined are Ecuador’s political history, President Correa’s 
administration, and the United States-Ecuador relationship. 
1. Ecuador’s Role in the Drug Trade 
The literature identifies Ecuador as a country not known as a major 
producer of cocaine, which surprises many people since it is nestled among 
three of the world’s largest coca producers—Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. 
Ecuador’s involvement in drug cultivation has never been defined as a national 
security threat to the United States. Rivera Velez asserts that although coca 
crops were found in Ecuador in recent years, the country historically has not 
engaged in cultivation. This noncultivation legacy can trace its roots to the 
seventeenth century, when the Spanish colonial government abolished coca 
production. The abolishment created a void that eliminated the transfer of 
cultivation techniques between generations. Furthermore, it is believed that in the 
seventeenth century, Jesuit priests effectively substituted the historical and 
cultural use of coca by converting the lower cocalero zones in the Chota Valley to 
produce aguardiente, a liquor similar to brandy that is made from sugar cane.4 In 
contrast, Peru and Bolivia maintained their coca traditions, eventually becoming 
two of the most dominant producers of cocaine.5 Some of the literature claims 
                                            
4 Carlos Espinoza Fernandez de Cordoba, Una Amenaza Silenciosa: El Narcotrafico en 
Ecuador [A Silent Threat: Drug Trafficking in Ecuador] (Quito: San Francisco University of Quito, 
2009): 138, http://www.usfq.edu.ec/publicaciones/polemika/Documents/polemika001/ 
polemika001_018_articulo014.pdf.  
5 Fredy Rivera Velez, “Ecuador: Untangling the Drug War,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin 
America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2005), 233. 
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that Ecuador serves as a transshipment hub for illegal narcotics and precursor 
chemicals, and is vulnerable to transnational criminal organizations due to its 
weak and corruptible public institutions and porous borders. 
The most recent literature proclaims Ecuador as the “United Nations (UN)” 
of organized crime, due to the increase in arrests of individuals connected to 
trafficking organizations from various regions of the world. Ecuador earned this 
label in 2011, after a series of events such as the indictment of three Russian 
criminals, the extradition of 66 Eritrean nationals involved in human trafficking, 
the arrest of a top Colombian drug leader, and the extradition of Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) members tied to deals made with 
the Sinaloa Cartel on Ecuadorian territory.6 In its 2015 drug report, the U.S. State 
Department notes that on September 15, 2014, Ecuador was identified by the 
president as a major illicit-drug-producing and/or drug-transit country, with 
subsequent notification to Congress.7 
Literature on cultivation and production, such as the 2010 United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Illicit Crop Monitoring Report for Ecuador, 
indicates that representatives from the United Nations do not believe Ecuador 
plays a significant role in the cultivation of drugs.8 The report further highlights 
that all the marijuana, coca, and opium plants found in the country were 
completely eradicated, and that 10 drug laboratories were found with key 
processing chemicals. Most of the fields and laboratories were found in Bolivar 
and Esmeraldas provinces. In Bolivar province, the government successfully 
eradicated 35,000 coca plants, representing 60.6% of the year’s total and 79,000 
                                            
6 Elyssa Pachico, “Ecuador the ‘UN of Crime’ and Venezuela the ‘Refuge of Terrorism’?,” 
InSight Crime, July 11, 2011, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/ecuador-the-un-of-crime-
and-venezuela-the-refuge-of-terrorism. 
7 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I Drug 
and Chemical Control (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2015), 160, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239560.pdf. 
8 Gobierno de Ecuador, Ecuador: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2009,[Ecuador: Coca Crop 
Monitoring Report 2009] (Ecuador: UNODC, 2010): 4, 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/cropmonitoring/Ecuador/Ecu09_Coca_Survey_es.pdf.   
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poppy plants, representing 68.4% of the year’s total.9 In contrast, interviews with 
locals near the Colombian-Ecuadorian border conducted by Ramirez and 
Youngers during their 2011 Carter Center study revealed that cocaine production 
is increasing.10 The 2010 crop-monitoring report was the last survey conducted in 
Ecuador regarding illicit cultivation; however, recent reports on Peru and 
Colombia reveal that production is increasing in areas that border Ecuador.11 In 
summary, the literature on Ecuador’s role in the drug trade suggests a country 
used as a transshipment hub where drug seizures are on the rise—in essence, a 
small-scale drug producer. 
a. History of Cocaine in the Andes 
In the literature on the history of cocaine in the Andes, the most complete 
narrative is found in Paul Gutenberg’s Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global 
Drug. Gutenberg discusses how the evolution of coca and cocaine products must 
be viewed from an Andean, specifically Peruvian, perspective. In charting the 
drug’s trajectory in the region, he identifies three long arcs and global 
processes.12 The first spans from the 1850s through 1910, when cocaine gained 
medical prestige.13 The next period, from the early twentieth century through the 
1940s, witnessed a decline in the market of Andean cocaine, as the United 
States embarked on its anti-cocaine policies. The final period, from 1945 to 1975, 
                                            
9 Gobierno de Ecuador, Ecuador: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2009, [Ecuador: Coca Crop 
Monitoring Report 2009] 4.  
10 Socorro Ramirez and Coletta Youngers, “Drug Policies in the Andes: Seeking Humane 
and Effective Alternatives,” (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2011): 37, http://www.cartercenter.org/ 
resources/pdfs/peace/americas/dialogue-forum/Book-Drug-Policy-in-the-Andes.pdf. 
11 Gobierno de Peru, Peru: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2014, [Peru: Coca Crop 
Monitoring Report 2014] (Peru: UNODC, 2015), 48, http://www.unodc.org/documents/ 
cropmonitoring/Peru/Peru_Informe_monitoreo_coca_2014_ web.pdf; Government of Colombia, 
Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2014 (Colombia: UNODC, 2015), 17, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Colombia/censo_INGLES_2014_WEB.pdf. 
12 Paul Gootenburg, Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2008), 3.  
13 Ibid., 33. 
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marked cocaine’s emergence as a world-renowned, illicit, pleasure drug.14 The 
beginning of this final period saw Peru’s legal narcotics industry readily convert to 
an illicit one. As a result, illicit flows of cocaine proliferated via a new class of 
Pan-American traffickers that, surprisingly, did not include many from Colombia, 
which eventually became the focal point of drug trafficking toward the end of this 
period. Despite this well-researched history of Andean cocaine, the author offers 
very little on Ecuador within this historical context. He simply states, “Ecuador, 
with no coca culture of its own, was a known transit and trading post for cocaine 
smugglers, and . . . served as Andean regional couriers.”15 To date, Ecuador has 
continued to maintain this role as a hub for illegal narcotics and precursor 
chemicals. 
b. Evolution of Narcotics Prohibition: The Andean Target 
Much of the literature on the Andean cocaine trade focuses on U.S. 
policies and the associated war on drugs. Furthermore, a significant amount of 
that literature criticizes the failure of U.S. policies to achieve its intended 
objectives. Before one examines the history of narcotics within the Andes, one 
must gain a grasp of the historical literature on narcotics in general. Specifically, 
one must understand how the early creation and evolution of global narcotics 
prohibition regimes impacted contemporary drug policies within the Andes.  
Although restrictions on narcotics, primarily opium, existed prior to the 
1870s, the origins of the global narcotics prohibition regimes was significantly 
influenced by the association of drug use to minorities, the power politics 
approach exerted by the United States, and the actions by various countries and 
the UN to institutionalize prohibition efforts. To augment this point, Andreas and 
Nadelmann discuss how “few governments objected strongly to signing an 
international convention and implementing the necessary domestic legislation to 
                                            
14 Gootenburg, Andean Cocaine, 5.  
15 Ibid., 273. 
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fulfill their international obligation, particularly when pressured to do so by the 
United States and the United Nations (UN).”16 Accordingly, prohibition in Ecuador 
began in 1934, when the government ratified the 1925 United Nations’ 
convention against opium. These policies were adopted purely to comply with 
international norms and did not take into account the country’s needs.17 In 
general, drug prohibition initially emphasized restrictions and limitations; 
however, by mid-twentieth century, narcotic prohibitions began to evolve into an 
enforcement apparatus, involving punitive and coercive measures that became 
more stringent over time. After World War II, successive UN conventions created 
tougher enforcement measures and multiplied the number of illegal drugs from 
“17 in 1931 to 245 by 1995.”18 In the United States, the punitive approach of 
narcotic was amplified by the recurring fabricated hysteria such as with the 
association of drugs to unsavory clientele or the feared and despised minority 
groups, and to sensationalist media and reports that only depicted minorities 
committing horrendous crimes while under the influence.19 The punitive 
measures were further amplified by hastily adopted U.S. legislation that failed to 
emphasize treatment and addiction. 
In his critical examination of the global narcotics trade, Alfred McCoy 
highlights how the contemporary era of the 1980s, through the turn of the 
century, witnessed a continued punitive approach to antidrug efforts in both the 
domestic and international arenas. The Reagan era, which lasted through most 
of the 1980s, experienced various rounds of legislation that each stiffened the 
                                            
16 Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime 
Control in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 44. 
17 Ana Isabel Jacome Rosenfeld, “Drogas en el Ecuador: Politica Prohibitiva o Democracia 
Deliberative?” [Drugs in Ecuador: Prohibitive Policy or Deliberative Democracy] Revista 
Latinoamericana de Seguridad Ciudadana [Latin American Journal of Public Safety] 13 (2013): 
84, http://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/urvio/article/viewFile/81-94/1091. 
18 Alfred McCoy, “The Stimulus of Prohibition: A Critical History of the Global Narcotics 
Trade,” in Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes, 
ed. Michael K. Steinberg, Joseph J. Hobbs, and Kent Mathewson (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 27. 
19 Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe, 41. 
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punitive measures associated with illegal drugs. In 1986, President Reagan 
announced, “Individual drug use was threatening the health and safety of all our 
citizens.”20 In the United States, the punitive approach to the drug war was 
reemphasized in 1988 with the passage of the Omnibus Drug Initiate Act, which 
resorted to adversarial measures that imposed larger fines and made violators 
ineligible for student, loans, public housing or attain driver’s licenses.21  
The United States redirected the war on drugs away from Asia to the 
Andes region after President Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive No. 
221 classified drug trafficking as a threat to U.S. national security, and legitimized 
the extension of the domestic drug policy beyond U.S. borders.22 This redirected 
effort toward the Andes included a massive coca eradication effort through a mix 
of repression and diplomacy.23 From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the United 
States funded the supply-side, which focused on international interdiction and 
domestic enforcement. These efforts accounted for 80% of the U.S. antidrug 
budget, thus leaving inadequate resources for proper addiction treatment and 
education. This global interdiction and enforcement effort was taken to new 
heights in 2000, when President Clinton expanded the drug war with the  
$1.3 billion Plan Colombia.24 This effort provided antidrug training and 
sophisticated equipment to the Colombian military, and defoliated 75,000 acres 
of coca in two months.25 Unfortunately, similar to other efforts that attempted to 
interrupt the drug flow, the balloon effect triumphed and pushed cultivation to 
other locations in the Andes.26 In 2002, the George W. Bush administration 
                                            
20 John McWilliams, “Through the Past Darkly: The Politics and Policies of America’s Drug 
War,” in Drug Control Policy, ed. William O. Walker III (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University, 1992), 25. 
21 Ibid., 26–27. 
22 McCoy, “The Stimulus of Prohibition,” 56. 
23 Ibid., 28. 
24 Ibid. 




further compounded this effect by proclaiming to cut drug abuse by 25% through 
further aggressive law enforcement.27 According to Alfred McCoy, “At the start of 
the twenty-first century, the United States was fighting the drug war at home by 
creating the world’s largest prison population and abroad by defoliating mountain 
farms in Asia and the Andes.”28 This thesis does not aim to address whether the 
punitive approach was either ineffective or effective, as one can argue that 
Colombia’s current state would be much worse without the efforts of Plan 
Colombia. The above narrative serves only as background on the counterdrug 
efforts in Latin America, which, perhaps, helps explain why Ecuador has 
implemented new drug law reforms and distanced itself from the United States. 
2. Ecuador’s Domestic Politics and Rafael Correa 
Literature on Ecuador’s domestic politics describes a history of extended 
political, economic, and social turbulence that severely impacted the county’s 
democratic institutions.29 Fed up with Ecuador’s perpetual turmoil and political 
instability, Rafael Correa ran for the presidency and was elected in 2007. 
Claiming that Ecuador’s political and economic problems were due to the selfish 
interests of the traditional parties and elites, Correa’s campaign pledged to 
reform congress and the courts, strengthen the economy, and alter the nation’s 
foreign policy.30 Since his election, he has proven to be one of the country’s most 
enduring leaders. His election came on the heels of a presidential crisis where, in 
the decade prior, three elected presidents, Abdala, Bucaram, Jamil Mahuad, and 
Lucio Gutierrez, were removed from office through congressionally-led coup 
d’états. Once in office, Correa called a constitutional assembly to revise the 
                                            
27 McCoy, “The Stimulus of Prohibition,” 28. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Amy Kennemore and Gregory Weeks, “Twenty-First Century Socialism? The Elusive 
Search for a Post-Neoliberal Development Model in Bolivia and Ecuador,” Journal of the Society 
for Latin American Studies 30, no. 3 (2011): 274, doi: 10.1111/j.1470-9856.2010.00496.x. 
30 Carlos de la Torre and A. Ortiz Lemos, “Populist Polarization and the Slow Death of 




constitution and, in the process, managed to stack the courts with loyal 
supporters, resulting in an approved constitution the following year. The new 
constitution effectively granted greater power to the president, while 
simultaneously lessening the independence of other government institutions.31 
The new constitution required a new election and, due to his wide popularity, he 
was reelected in 2009, and again, for a third consecutive time, in 2013. This 
current term ends in 2017; however, Congress approved a constitutional 
amendment that allows indefinite consecutive presidential terms in December 
2015.32 The amendment, however, contained a clause negating a bid for Correa 
in 2017, but it allows him to run in 2021 for unlimited terms.33 In all, throughout 
his years as president, Correa has managed to centralize all power under the 
executive branch, suppress opponents, and bully the media. 
D. U.S.-ECUADORIAN RELATIONS 
In addition to a politically chaotic environment, literature on the Correa 
administration also describes many events that have contributed to the 
downward trend in the U.S.-Ecuadorian relationship. One of the key events took 
place in the early stages of Correa’s first term, when he announced the closure of 
the U.S. military’s Manta Forward Operating Location (FOL), which served as a 
counter narcotics hub in the Andean region.34 Tension between the nations was 
also exacerbated by the ensuing legal battle between Ecuador and Chevron, the 
U.S.-based oil corporation. In this particular case, Ecuador demanded 
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compensation for environmental damages in their eastern region.35 The 
WikiLeaks revelations and the granting of asylum to WikiLeaks founder Julian 
Assange also impacted relations and ignited a series of political shots between 
the two countries, including the expulsion of each other’s ambassadors.36 Lastly, 
the expulsion of U.S. officials and the closure of the Security Cooperation Office 
(SCO) in April of 2014, followed by the closure of the Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ (INL) office in September, further 
contributed to the rocky relationship. The tension in the relationship is 
disconcerting, especially when considering the impact on counternarcotics 
efforts. 
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Ecuador’s weak institutions are a common explanation for the country’s 
increased role in the cocaine trade. Various scholarly articles and reports simply 
state that Ecuador’s financial, security, and judicial institutions are weak and 
corrupt, but they tend to stop there without further explanation. Ecuador’s 
supposedly weak institutions must be addressed in further detail to uncover how 
they may be contributing to the overall increase in cocaine flow. 
In addition to these common explanations, research has discovered other 
factors that may explain the increased flow of cocaine, which lead to two key 
hypotheses. The first factor involves determining whether the increase in 
seizures is attributed to Ecuador’s self-proclaimed improved antinarcotics 
enforcement or if the flow of cocaine is simply just escalating. For this factor, the 
author hypothesizes that the heightened cocaine seizures are attributed to an 
increased flow of cocaine, rather than improved antinarcotics enforcement. If the 
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hypothesis holds true, one must take a deeper analytic approach to unearth what 
is causing the increase in cocaine flow. Therefore, a pertinent second factor 
would involve Ecuador’s domestic politics and its relationship with the United 
States. Ecuador’s domestic politics aim to distance the country from the United 
States, and consequently, the relationship is experiencing a downward trend. As 
a result, bilateral counternarcotic efforts have been severely impacted. Therefore, 
the second hypothesis is that the political environment, coupled with the removal 
of U.S. counternarcotics influence, creates a low-threat environment for criminal 
organizations to operate in, thereby resulting in increased cocaine flow through 
Ecuador. 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will be a qualitative, single-case study. The single-case study 
research method is appropriate because it will provide a comprehensive analysis 
of the factors that explain Ecuador’s emergence in the cocaine trade. Ecuador 
deserves attention from a cocaine trade perspective, and this thesis aims to 
contribute to the literature. The interest in this case initially stems from Andean 
cocaine production and transit maps presented in a course that did not include 
Ecuador, which was surprising since the country is essentially in the epicenter of 
the Andean region. As already discussed, the recent trends in increased cocaine 
seizures and transnational criminal organization activities further exacerbated the 
interest in this topic. Actions of the current presidential policies and the weak 
state institutions are also a critical component to the analysis of this 
phenomenon. Sources for this thesis will be derived from primary and secondary 
sources including scholarly books, peer-reviewed journals, both government and 




G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of five chapters. The second chapter will discuss 
Ecuador’s role in the cocaine trade. It will provide background on the drug 
seizure and transnational criminal organization trends, the shift in control of the 
supply chain, the country’s internal routes, and methods of transit. Chapter III 
discusses Ecuador’s domestic politics and relations with the United States. It 
provides background on Ecuador’s political history in the decade prior to Correa, 
followed by his rise to power and his “Citizen’s Revolution.” The chapter then 
turns to Ecuador’s drug policies, followed by a narrative on the downward trend 
of the United States-Ecuador relationship. Chapter IV explains the increase in 
cocaine flow by first discussing the common explanation, such as corruption and 
weak institutions. The chapter then describes how Ecuador’s new drug reforms 
and the elimination of U.S. intervention further explain the increase in cocaine 
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II. ECUADOR’S ROLE IN THE COCAINE SUPPLY CHAIN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although Ecuador’s involvement in the cocaine trade can be traced back 
before the 1990s, a 1990 New York Times article titled “Latin Drug Cartels, 
Squeezed, are Turning to Ecuador” described Ecuador as a “new target of 
opportunity.”37 At that time, Ecuador was not considered a critical node in the 
cocaine trade and counternarcotics aid provided to the country was minimal, 
compared to its northern neighbor, Colombia.38 American intelligence reports 
also indicated that while aggressive antidrug policies were enforced primarily in 
Colombia and Peru, the Colombian cartels found Ecuador appealing for transiting 
drugs due to its close proximity, accessible ports, established routes, and 
relatively loose drug laws.39 Regional and international concerns were 
heightened by the magnitude of cocaine seizures within the United States and 
Europe that arrived via commercial vessels originating and registered in Ecuador. 
These seizures, coupled with the large quantities of precursor chemicals 
traversing through the country, firmly established Ecuador as a narcotics transit 
point.40 At the time the article was published, various officials from the Drug 
Enforcement Agency, the Department of State (DOS), and the Customs Service 
estimated that Ecuador provided the United States with 6.4% (and rising) of the 
total cocaine produced worldwide—an alarming statistic for a country dismissed 
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as a relative nonactor in the drug trade.41 Fast-forwarding 15 years, Ecuador 
once again finds itself in a situation of increased cocaine seizures and 
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). Although the Ecuadorian 
government claims that the recent increases in cocaine seizures is attributed to 
improved antinarcotics operations, the increases more accurately reflect a higher 
flow of cocaine transiting through the country. Prior to identifying the factors that 
are driving the recent increase in drug seizures, this chapter will address 
Ecuador’s current role in the cocaine trade. It begins by addressing the current 
trends in cocaine seizures and TCOs, and then discusses the shifts in cocaine 
routes, followed by an assessment of Ecuador’s internal drug routes, maritime 
trafficking, internal drug distributions, and precursor chemicals. 
B. CURRENT TRENDS: COCAINE AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
According to the Ecuadorian Ministry of the Interior, since 2010, Ecuador 
has witnessed an increase in cocaine seizures, as highlighted in Figure 1. In 
2014, the government seized a five-year high of 61.63 tons of various drugs; 
however, it was primarily cocaine. The seizures conducted in the first half of 2015 
indicate that the trafficking continues to rise. As of July 2015, the country 
reported the seizure of 48.5 tons, which is on pace to reach the 100-ton marker 
and break the 10-year record high set in 2009. Of the drugs confiscated in 2015, 
84% was cocaine and 8% was cocaine paste. According to Colonel Edmundo 
Moncayo, the Zone 8 police commander responsible for the cities of Guayaquil, 
Durán, Samborondón and the rural sectors of Progresso, Posorja, and Tenguel, 
the increase in confiscations is attributable to the effectiveness of the Unit 
Against Trafficking in Domestic Consumption (UCTCI) operating in Quito, 
Guayaquil, and Manta. Furthermore, he noted that the 379.5 tons of drugs seized 
since 2007 far exceed the 81 tons confiscated in the 10 years that the Manta 
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FOL was in operation.42 While that statistic may strengthen his argument, the 81 
tons reflects off-shore seizures, and the 379.5 tons reflects total seizures 
throughout the country. When analyzed from a maritime perspective, off-shore 
drug seizures were drastically reduced after the FOL’s closure. In 2010, off-shore 
seizure rates fell to four tons and, in 2011, it dropped even further—to less than 
two tons; thus, demonstrating their ineffectiveness in the maritime arena.43 
Furthermore, as plausible as Colonel Moncayo’s claim may appear on the 
surface, the increase in seizures is better attributed to the increase in drugs 
flowing through the country that provide ample opportunities for such seizures. 
The heightened number of TCOs operating in Ecuador seeking to capitalize off 
the cocaine trade is a key indicator that supports the increase in cocaine flows. 
Figure 1.  Ecuadorian Drug Seizures between 2007 and 2015 
Source: “Ecuador Almost Duplicates Drug Seizures between 2014 and 2015,” 
Agencia Publica de Noticias del Ecuador y Suramerica, [Public News Agency of 
Ecuador and South America] July 13, 2015, http://www.andes.info.ec/en/ 
news/ecuador-almost-duplicates-drug-seizure-between-2014-and-2015-adding-
400-tons-eight-years.html. 
42 “Ecuador Almost Duplicates Drug Seizures Between 2014 and 2015.” 
43 “Drug Trafficking: Has Ecuador Lost the Pacific? Part One,” The Center for Investigative 
Journalism in the Americas, August 24, 2014, http://thecija.org/blog/2014/08/24/part-one-drug-
trafficking-has-ecuador-lost-the-pacific/. 
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In terms of TCOs, trends indicate that Ecuador is becoming a hotbed for 
such groups, as gangs, cartels, and mafias from all over the world have taken up 
residence in this small Andean country.44 To understand why criminal 
organizations have run rampant, one must observe what is happening in 
countries within the Andean region, along with countries in other regions, such as 
Central America. Within these regions, the two countries that have most 
significantly impacted the proliferation of TCOs are Mexico and Colombia. 
C. SHIFT FROM COLOMBIA TO MEXICO 
A 2011 United States Senate report highlighted how the Mexican drug 
cartels were moving south, particularly to Central America. According to the 
report, the organizations are moving south to gain control over drug routes and 
market share, and are doing so with the same amount of violence that has 
plagued Mexico.45 The influence of Mexican drug cartels began in the 1980s and 
1990s, as the Colombian cartels rerouted their established Caribbean routes 
through Central America, with the ultimate goal of reaching the United States 
without being interdicted. When the drugs would reach the United States via the 
Mexican routes, they would switch possession back over to the Colombians for 
further distribution throughout the Colombians’ established retail distribution 
network. As U.S. law and drug enforcement agencies began to crack down on 
Colombian drug organizations within the United States and overseas, the cartels 
strategically decided to relinquish their control of the U.S. cocaine wholesale 
distribution to Mexican drug traffickers; however, they maintained control of the 
smuggling routes through Central America. With Mexican drug organizations now 
able to purchase cocaine at wholesale prices, and with their ability to attain the 
highest possible profit margin on the cocaine they smuggled into the United 
44 Arthur Dhont, “Ecuador Increases its Haul From Drugs Traffic,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 
27, no. 2 (2014), http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1648841794/ 
709A9505314641A8PQ/5?accountid=12702 
45 Dianne Feinstein and Charles Grassley, Responding to Violence in Central America 




States, multiple trafficking organizations within Mexico flourished by capitalizing 
on the lucrative profits found in the drug trade.46 
During this time, Colombian money-laundering schemes operating in the 
United States were also disrupted by U.S. law enforcement through covert 
operations and aggressive banking regulations.47 The Mexican cartels 
capitalized on this opportunity and used the same smuggling routes that pushed 
cocaine north to smuggle large amounts of Colombian drug profits out of the 
United States. As a result, Mexican traffickers now controlled the smuggling of 
wholesale cocaine and its distribution throughout the United States, which 
enabled them to rake in enormous profits. The Mexican trafficking organizations 
also profited from the fees they charged the Colombian cartels that ensured the 
safe passage of money going south to Colombia.48 
D. THE SHIFT FROM MEXICO, SOUTH TO CENTRAL AMERICA AND 
THE ANDES 
The Mexican government did not stand idle as the drug-trafficking 
situation scaled out of control. In 2006, the Filipe Calderon administration went 
on the offensive against the cartels. This increased pressure by the government 
caused the cartels to seek new areas of operations, which resulted in shifts into 
territories already claimed by other organizations. This battle for territory between 
drug organizations in Mexico resulted in an estimated 36,000 homicides from 
December 2006 through December 2010.49 As pressure from the Mexican 
government mounted, coupled with their ability to expand, the drug cartels began 
to position themselves farther down the cocaine supply chain into Central 
                                            






America.50 Other factors also made Central America an advantageous area from 
which to operate. According to the 2011 U.S. Senate Caucus on International 
Narcotics Control, “There are many reasons why Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations decided to move into Central America, including freedom from 
prosecution, weak governance, relaxed enforcement of laws and geography. 
Simply put, it is a ‘business friendly’ environment for criminal organizations.”51 
The two primary countries where the Mexican cartels settled were Honduras and 
Guatemala, due to their strategic location and weak, corruptible governments.52 
The caucus report also states that in the three years prior to the report  
(2008-2010), the main drug-trafficking organizations operating in Central America 
were the Zetas, Sinaloa, and Gulf Cartels.53 Ultimately, these and other factors 
caused the cartels to make their way to South America to occupy Andean 
countries, such as Ecuador, in or near the production side of the cocaine supply 
chain spectrum. 
Over the last five years, Ecuador has become host to a variety of TCOs 
from all over the world. Control over the Ecuadorian drug trade, traditionally 
controlled by Colombian groups that monopolized transit routes throughout the 
country, is currently transitioning over to Mexican cartels that seek to dethrone 
the Colombian middlemen and control a wider spectrum of the cocaine supply 
chain. Prior to 2011, the Mexican cartels did not possess the operational capacity 
to push their own product northward through their established routes, and 
therefore settled into the role of buyer from the Colombians. Evidence of Mexican 
cartels attempting to take control of the supply chain within Ecuador began in 
2011, with the arrest of three Mexicans, along with the confiscation of their “go-
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fast” boats off the Ecuadorian coast. Data obtained from investigating the boats’ 
global positioning system tracked the boats leaving Mexico and stopping for gas 
in Central America prior to arriving in Ecuador.54 Furthermore, the arrests of nine 
confirmed Sinaloa Cartel members, the murder of a policeman investigating the 
cartel, the discovery of narco-planes with large amounts of cocaine and money 
onboard, and reports of two armed Sinaloa cells posted throughout the country’s 
southern borders were further tell-tale signs of Mexican drug organizations 
seeking to control the 220 tons of cocaine flowing through Ecuador.55 In 
February 2012, the arrest of Daniel “El Loco” Barrera, the presumed main link 
between the Colombian traffickers and the Sinaloa Cartel, further demonstrated 
Mexico’s growing foothold in Ecuador.56 A similar event occurred in 2013, when 
Ecuadorian police confirmed the arrest of Caesar “El Empresario” Vernaza 
Quiñonez, accused of leading local criminal groups and serving as the new main 
link to the Sinaloa Cartel. 
The Sinaloa Cartel is certainly not the only organization that sees Ecuador 
as a strategic operating location. According to the 2014 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report (INCSR) report, “Mexican, Colombian, Nigerian, 
Russian, Italian, and Chinese transnational criminal organizations including Los 
Zetas . . . Gulf cartels, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 
are actively operating in Ecuador.”57 In 2011, Ecuador was labeled as the “United 
Nations” of organized crime, due to the increased arrests of individuals 
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connected to criminal organizations from various regions of the world. The events 
contributing to this title include the indictment of three Russian criminals, the 
extradition of 66 Eritrean nationals involved in human trafficking, the arrest of a 
top Colombian drug leader; and the extradition of FARC members tied to deals 
made with the Sinaloa Cartel on Ecuadorian territory.58 In addition to these 
organizations, the Mexico-based criminal organization known as La Familia 
Michoacána (LFM) is also transporting drugs through Ecuador. Founded by 
former Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas members in 2006, LFM gained control of the 
Mexican ports of Lázaro, Cárdenas, and Michoacán and became a major drug 
distributor. Within Ecuador, LFM members transport drugs to Mexico, the United 
States, and Europe via air, land, and sea. The LFM has formed alliances with 
Colombian traffickers to get the cocaine and then hire local Ecuadorian gangs to 
transport drugs past the northern border.59 LFM also uses these gangs to attain 
false identification documents and fishing permits that facilitate their operations 
within Ecuador. 
Fortunately, the presence of the Sinaloa and LFM Cartels has not fueled 
the same level of violence as seen in Mexico, Colombia, or Central America. 
According to Daniel Pontón, “Mexican organized crime groups operating in 
Ecuador want to use drug trafficking routes through local networks to ensure a 
steady supply of drugs, but are not interested in fighting for territory.”60 Although 
violence has certainly occurred, as noted above, the low level of violence has 
appeared to cause security forces in Ecuador to underestimate the magnitude of 
the trafficking problem. History certainly shows that organized crime and violence 
are tightly woven together. In 2011, reports indicated that Mexican drug groups, 
operating in Colombia, have clashed with Colombian organizations, as they 
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inform authorities of each other’s shipments.61 The presence of Mexican cartels 
in Ecuador is certainly an indication of the cartels’ sought-after dominance of the 
entire cocaine supply chain. Colombian organizations, however, will doubtfully 
relinquish their established position without an escalation of violence. This 
situation, according to Edward Fox, “may turn Ecuador into a battle ground 
between some of the most powerful criminal organizations in the hemisphere.”62 
E. ECUADOR IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN: INTERNAL ROUTES 
The amount of cocaine seizures and the number of cartels operating in 
Ecuador solidify its place of importance as a transit hub for cocaine destined to 
all parts of the world. Capturing a complete picture of these transit routes is a 
difficult task, considering that they are continuously changed to stay ahead of law 
enforcement. According to Xavier Raufer, “Tracing a cocaine route is impossible 
because the ink never dries on the page, channels change.”63 Although his quote 
was referring to the global shift in cocaine routes through Africa, the same 
phenomenon holds true when applied on a smaller, local scale, as in the case of 
Ecuador. It is because of the constant evolution of routes that various articles call 
out multiple cities where cocaine enters, as well as numerous coastal cities 
where it exits. Nonetheless, since Ecuador is integrated into the cocaine supply 
chain, a discussion is merited in terms of understanding where cocaine enters 
and leaves the country, and where it stays within the borders for domestic 
distribution and consumption. Figure 2 is a graphical representation of trafficking 
routes based on recent research. 
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Figure 2.  Ecuadorian Drug Routes  
 
This figure captures current drug routes based on research. Adapted from: “Map 
of Ecuador,” Google Maps, Accessed December 16, 2015, 
https://www.google.com/maps/@-2.046804,-81.779115,6z. 
Sandwiched to its north and south between two of the world’s largest 
producers of cocaine, Colombia and Peru, it is no wonder that the substance 
primarily enters from these two geographic areas. While Ecuador is unlike its 
other Andean neighbors in that it is not a mass producer of the coca leaf, it is not 
exempt from the presence of cocaine within its borders. Once in country, the 
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Ecuadorian police assert that hundreds of trafficking routes exist to move cocaine 
from Colombia and Peru into Ecuador. Multiple cities also operate as key 
distribution points for both the international and domestic cocaine trade. These 
include the country’s biggest port, Guayaquil; the capital, Quito; and 10 other 
cities. 
On the southern Ecuadorian border, the main points of cocaine entry from 
Peru are through the Ecuadorian provinces of El Oro and Loja, specifically the 
towns of El Guabo, Piñas, Machala, Zaruma, and Macara.64 According to Jaime 
Antezana, a Peruvian narco-trafficking investigator, an estimated 15 tons of 
cocaine hydrochloride is produced in the northern Peruvian province of Piura.65 A 
recent article highlights how Peru traffickers periodically reinvent routes going 
north, toward Ecuador. Previously, routes within Piura normally departed from 
the towns of Huancabamba, Aragoto, or Ayabaca. The latter is known for the 
largest concentration of trafficking activities and attracts attention due to the large 
quantity of off-road vehicles, with Ecuadorian license plates; electronic 
equipment for Internet and cable; and large homes with satellite communication 
equipment.66 New routes, however, have emerged from Piura through the towns 
of Suyo, Alamor, and Las Lomas. Antezana also asserts that the basic cocaine 
paste processed in Cajamarca and Amazonas is trafficked to Ecuador and 
Colombia through the routes in the province of Piura.67 The above-mentioned 
article points out that many areas in this northern region lack police control and 
that the antidrug division, composed of only 52 agents, is logistically constrained. 
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Examples of their constraints include having only two trucks, which are rationed 
to only consume five gallons of gas per day.68 
The cultivation that occurs in the Maranon zone of Peru supplies most of 
these towns with cocaine and cocaine paste. The 2015 illicit crop monitoring 
report for Peru calculated that the zone witnessed a 6.5% increase in the 
cultivation of coca from the previous year. According to the report, this upward 
tick is a consequence of the demand from traffickers operating on the Pacific 
coast, who export the cocaine outside of the region.69 The report also states the 
main destination for cocaine from the Maranon zone is the Peruvian town of 
Chiclayo, from which it is then transported to the port of Paita in Piura province 
and then on to Ecuador.70 To enter Ecuador, the cocaine is transported to the 
Ecuadorian border towns of Zapotillo, Macara, and many others, and is then 
dispersed throughout the hundreds of interior routes within Ecuador. 
On the northern border, the principal points of entry are found in the 
provinces of Esmeraldas, Carchi, and Sucumbíos, specifically the towns of 
Tulcan, San Lorenzo, and Nueva Loja.71 These provinces border the Narino and 
Putumayo departments of Colombia, which are known areas of mass coca 
cultivation and heavily populated by guerrilla and paramilitary forces. The 2015 
illicit-crop-monitoring report for Colombia indicated that, in 2014, these two 
departments observed the main increases in coca crops.72 The report also 
asserts that 73% of the total coca crop is concentrated in the southern 
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departments of Nariño, Cauca, Putumayo, and Caquetá.73 Specifically, the two 
bordering provinces account for 45% of the total coca fields in Colombia.74 The 
cocaine transiting through Ecuador shows no signs of diminishing due to the 
increase in coca cultivation, coupled with the exit points found along the 
Ecuadorian coast. 
F. MARITIME TRAFFICKING 
Once the cocaine enters Ecuador, it is either distributed domestically or 
exported globally. As innovative as drug traffickers are, a plethora of methods are 
used to traffic drugs. In this section, however, we will focus on maritime 
trafficking. In terms of exit points, drug traffickers appear to have the freedom to 
operate from any city located along Ecuador’s Pacific coast. The most reported 
coastal cities where operations occur include Esmeraldas, Manta, Rocafuerte, 
Muisne, and the Galapagos Islands. Guayaquil, Ecuador’s largest city, is also a 
key exit point, along with the various towns located within close proximity, such 
as Puerto Bolivar and Isla Puna.75 Multiple methods are used to export cocaine 
out of Ecuador; however, according to a 2013 report from the Police 
Communities of the Americas (Ameripol), a regional organization that promotes 
cooperation among police forces, maritime transport is the largest trafficking 
scenario in Ecuador and is also used by trafficking organizations for illicit 
deliveries.76 Furthermore, the 2013 UN World Drug report asserts, “Ecuador 
[has] emerged as an important hub in South America for maritime trafficking of 
cocaine.”77 The clandestine embarkation points are typically found in poor fishing 
communities, and deliveries primarily arrive from Colombia, as well as Peru. The 
antinarcotics chief from the Guayas province, Colonel Omar Paredes, explains 
                                            
73 Government of Colombia, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2014, 17. 
74 Ibid., 18. 
75 Pachico, “Security Forces Warn.” 
76 Situational Analysis of Drug Trafficking: A Police Point of View, 80–81. 




how trafficking organizations typically use speed boats, barges, or 
semisubmersibles to get cocaine destined for the U.S. market out of the country. 
According to Paredes, the trafficking methods described above are not usually 
intended for long voyages and often link up with larger boats to transfer the 
drugs. In scenarios where they do make the complete voyage, the larger boats 
often provide additional logistical support in order to continue their mission.78 The 
cocaine often makes pit stops in Central America or Mexico en route to its final 
destination—the United States. Since the discovery of the first narco-sub in 1993, 
the technology and capacity of submersibles have continued to improve, and 
these innovations and investments clearly signal that traffickers will continue to 
identify ways to effectively transport their products. In 2010, a 30-meter-long, 
Kevlar-coated submarine was seized along the northern Ecuadorian border. This 
vessel was constructed of fiberglass, equipped with a diesel-elective drive, and 
designed for both underwater and shallow operations.79 Furthermore, in 2014, 
another submarine was seized by the Ecuadorian police, which had the capacity 
to dive 15 feet and stay submerged for 15 minutes. According to Simeon Tegel, 
“The submersible highlights this nation’s burgeoning reputation as a transit point 
for cocaine out of the Andes and onward to the streets of New York, Sydney, 
Moscow, and Bangkok.”80 
Another predominant method of transporting cocaine to the United States, 
Mexico, and Europe is via shipping containers. An alarming statistic from the 
UNODC posits that an estimated 90% of the global cocaine trade is transported 
through these containers. This statistic equates to over 500 million containers 
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shipped annually, of which less than 2% are inspected.81 These facts make this 
shipping method an attractive target for drug traffickers seeking to transport illicit 
products worldwide. With regard to Ecuador, a 2008 report from the Crisis Group 
asserts that, “[Ecuadorian] Export firms, particularly shrimp companies, conceal 
drugs in containers.”82 The 2013 Ameripol report indicates how the country’s 
main exports (e.g., bananas, fish, fruit pulp, and iron tubes) are used to conceal 
illegal drugs in shipping containers.83 To illustrate an example, Belgian 
authorities seized eight tons of cocaine hidden in a shipment of bananas from 
Ecuador in October 2012.84 The report further indicates that trafficking 
organizations operating in Ecuador commonly use the “rip-off” method, also 
commonly known as ganchos ciegos, which involves the removal of the container 
locking seals, the placement of the drugs, then re-securing the container with a 
counterfeit seal.85 The UNODC explains that neither the individual shipper, nor 
the recipient of the cargo, know that their container has been used to stash illicit 
contraband.86 
G. PRECURSOR CHEMICALS 
Before cocaine is transformed into its powder form, it must be processed 
with certain solvents. These solvents are commonly referred to as precursor 
chemicals and primarily consist of sodium bicarbonate, kerosene, gasoline, 
hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid, potassium permanganate, ammonia, and acetone 
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or ether.87 These precursor chemicals are used at different steps of the process 
and many are used as substitutes, such as kerosene and gasoline. The 
availability and access to these chemicals can have a profound effect on the 
amount of cocaine produced by processing labs operating within a country’s 
borders, which also leads to an increase in the flow of coca paste and finished 
cocaine in and out of these labs. Many U.S. government documents introduce 
Ecuador as a transit area for precursor chemicals.88 The latest UN Ecuador crop-
monitoring report, published in 2009, highlights the discovery and destruction of 
10 processing laboratories (see Figure 3). Since the report, information on 
processing labs is released through national news outlets. In October 2013, 
Javier Cordova, Ecuador’s Vice Minister of Internal Security, stated in an 
interview with a news station that “drugs are not processed and coca leaves are 
not produced in our country.”89 While he may be correct that coca is not 
produced in mass proportions, the country’s inability to govern all of its territory 
makes the statement difficult to believe. A year prior to this statement, the 
AMERIPOL report stated that nine laboratories were destroyed between 2011 
and 2012.90 The news outlet La Hora, however, reported that 15 laboratories 
were discovered in 2012.91 Furthermore, an InSight Crime article reported that 
five laboratories were discovered in the first four months of 2015. Although the 
number of laboratories pales in comparison to the amount found in Colombia, 
their existence indicates that Ecuador is still a player in the cocaine trade. 
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Figure 3.  Discovery and Destruction of Ecuadorian Drug-Processing 
Laboratories in 2009 
 
 
Source: Gobierno de Ecuador, Ecuador: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2009, 
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III. ECUADOR’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND RELATIONS WITH 
THE UNITED STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter highlighted Ecuador’s role in the cocaine trade and 
evidence suggests that the flow of cocaine is increasing throughout the country. 
Prior to addressing the factors that help explain the increase in the flow and 
seizures of cocaine, one must first explore Ecuador’s political environment under 
the Correa administration, the precursors leading to his election, and the actions 
he has taken as president. The political environment in the decade prior to 
Correa’s victory in the 2006 presidential election is best characterized as 
turbulent and corrupt. Although domestic politics improved in terms of social 
spending after the election, many of the actions that Correa has taken to 
consolidate power under the executive branch and to silence the media and 
social movements have been questionable. Furthermore, throughout his tenure, 
Correa has had strained ties with United States, leading to the elimination of 
critical aerial antinarcotics operations and the expulsion of U.S. embassy officials 
from the SCO and INL located at the U.S. Embassy in Quito, Ecuador. These 
actions, coupled with the new drug law that essentially decriminalizes drug 
possession, creates a low-threat environment for cocaine traffickers. This chapter 
will first discuss the history of the political chaos in Ecuador, followed by an 
overview of Correa’s citizen revolution and his continued quest for complete 
control of the state. The paper then turns to a review of the drug policies of the 
pre-Correa era and those in effect during his tenure as president. Finally, this 
chapter discusses recent events affecting U.S.-Ecuadorian relations, which 
demonstrate a downward trend. 
B. A HISTORY OF POLITICAL CHAOS 
Ecuador’s current president, Rafael Correa, took control of the country in 
2007, and has since managed to foster tenuous relations with the United States 
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and also create an environment of internal political chaos. Initially, his election 
was welcomed, considering that in the previous two decades the country had 
been plagued with continuous economic crisis, fueled by attempts at trade 
liberalization and structural adjustments—economic policies promoted by the 
world bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). During this time, trade 
barriers were reduced, which increased international trade—primarily oil. 
Unfortunately, the poor implementation of such reforms due to the existing weak 
institutions and political instability caused disappointing overall economic growth 
and low reductions in poverty.92 According to Jose Duran, “From 1970 to 2006, 
income per capita growth has been low (1.3% per year, on average) and very 
unstable.”93 Furthermore, many depositors lost most, if not all, of their funds, 
when 16 of the 40 banks in Ecuador failed in 1999.94 The failed reforms of the 
1990s led to the major economic crisis of 1999, which resulted in a shift to the 
U.S. dollar in 2000. Economic reforms in the early 2000s also failed due to lack 
of regime stability, resulting from frequent turnovers of the presidency, beginning 
in 1996, when Abdalá Burarám served only six months prior to being relieved by 
congress due to “mental incapacity” and charges of corruption.95 This economic 
collapse also prompted the mass exodus of Ecuadorians to the United States 
and Europe in the early 2000s. 
The continued poor results of attempts to implement IMF-led economic 
policies resulted in an increase of mass protests throughout the country. The 
main force behind these protests was La Confederacion de Nacionalidades 
Indigenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) that ultimately formed the Pachakutik 
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Pluricultural Movement. In 2000, this movement was successful in ousting 
President Jamil Mahuad through a coup engineered by the Ecuadorian military.96 
President Mahuad’s administration was responsible for the dollarization of the 
economy and also for signing the agreement that allowed the United States to 
use the Ecuadorian Air Force Base at Manta as a forward operating location. The 
Mahuad presidency, however, was short-lived due to accusations of corruption, 
unpopular economic policies, and an unstable administration.97 He was 
succeeded by his vice president, Gustavo Noboa, who lost the presidential run-
off to Lucio Gutierrez in 2002. 
As a former military colonel and one of the masterminds behind the 
Mahuad coup, Gutierrez had obtained support from the indigenous population 
through his alliance with the CONAIE-Pachakutik Movement, which actively 
sought to move past neoliberal reforms and focus on the country’s social 
agendas. His presidential campaign promised to move past neoliberal reforms 
and even went as far to appoint key Pachakutik leaders in his administration.98 
The Gutierrez-Pachakutik alliance broke down after only nine months due to his 
failure to commit to social reforms. In an effort to ensure his political survival, 
Gutierrez compromised with various parties and continued economic 
liberalization to stay on good terms with the IMF. His administration was charged 
with corruption, however, and, as discontent for Gutierrez grew, a surge of 
middle-class protest hit the country’s capital, ultimately resulting in his 
impeachment in 2005.99 
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C. RAFAEL CORREA’S “CITIZEN REVOLUTION” 
As mentioned above, the decade prior to the 2006 election was plagued 
by persistent corruption, economic grief, and protests that resulted in the 
“interruption” of multiple presidencies, which deeply affected Ecuador’s 
democratic institutions.100 One of the 2006 presidential candidates, Rafael 
Correa, disenchanted with this decade of disappointment, vowed to end the 
partidocracia—a term used to describe political parties and elites deemed 
responsible for the country’s ongoing political and economic crisis, along with the 
degradation of the government’s institutions.101 
Raised in a humble middle-class family, Correa worked his way through a 
master’s degree at the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium and also 
received a second master’s degree and a doctorate in Economics from the 
University of Illinois. Prior to his run for the presidency, he was a faculty member 
at the University of San Francisco in Quito and also briefly served as the Minister 
of the Economy under Palacio’s short stint as the interim president, which served 
as a critical launching point for Correa’s political career.102 Correa was viewed as 
outside of the typical Ecuadorian political elite, not only due to his lack of 
experience, but also because of his fierce stance against the establishment.103 
According to Catherine Conaghan, Correa led a rock-star, attention-grabbing 
campaign that capitalized on all forms of media, a strategy never used before in 
an Ecuadorian presidential campaign.104 At rallies, he voiced his discontent with 
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the country’s economic dependency on outsiders and pledged to place the 
neoliberal reforms in the “trash bin of history.”105 Furthermore, he vowed to give 
“correazos,” or belt whippings (to play off his name), to Ecuador’s corrupt elite 
and rewrite the constitution.106 His campaign efforts resulted in the run-off victory 
over Noboa, and this self-proclaimed “Christian leftist” has since proven to be 
one of Ecuador’s most enduring political leaders, following a 10-year span 
marked by eight presidents. 
Figure 4.  President Rafael Correa 
 
Source: Paul M. Barrett, “Ecuadorian President’s Epic Chutzpah: From Snowden 
to Chevron,” Bloomberg, June 25, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/ 
2013-06-25/ecuadorian-presidents-epic-chutzpah-from-snowden-to-chevron. 
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Upon taking office, Correa pressed his plan to draft a new constitution in 
order to begin rebuilding the state. His aim was to establish a new political 
system that consolidated powers in the hands of the executive branch, with all 
other institutions becoming subordinate and without any real voice against his 
domination. Correa convoked a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution; 
however, it initially proved difficult because the opposition controlled multiple 
institutions such as law enforcement agencies, constitutional and electoral 
tribunals, the Supreme Court, and Congress.107 The opposition-led Congress 
called a referendum to decide whether to convoke the assembly and, in the 
process, became entrapped in legal issues over the control of the electoral 
tribunal. As a result, the electoral tribunal removed 58 congressional opponents 
on accusations of electoral sabotage and obstruction, and replaced them with 
easily influenced legislators.108 Consequently, the constitutional tribunal ruled 
against the action to dismiss the legislators; however, the now pro-Correa 
Congress replaced those judges as well.109 With obstacles out of the way, 
Correa convoked a referendum for a constituent assembly, which gained 
overwhelming support—82% in favor. Subsequently, Correa’s party, Patria Altiva 
y Soberana, also won 86 of the 130 assembly seats during the election.110 The 
new constitution was approved in September 2008, and its fundamental change 
required new elections for the presidency, congress, and positions at the local 
level. Correa achieved a 2009 first-round victory by attaining 52% of the votes, 
thus beginning a new four-year term with all the power in his hands. 
Correa again succeeded in winning the 2013 election by attaining 57% of 
the votes, thus solidifying the country’s continued movement toward an 
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authoritarian path.111 The manner in which the elections manifested were a great 
indicator of the amount of power that Correa possessed due to the lack of 
mechanisms for control and accountability. For example, his control over the 
media enabled him to embark on a nonstop campaign since he took office in 
2007. In contrast, his opponents were limited to the 42 days of campaigning, with 
severely restricted venues that limited their exposure, thus leading to the 
degradation of political debate.112 
As head of state, Correa has capitalized on oil revenues to implement his 
revolution from above, where he and his crew of eclectic technocrats aim to 
modernize the country and plan for Ecuador to become a key technology 
exporter by 2030. The goal for these “post-neoliberal technocrats” is to build 
sumak kawsay—meaning the life well lived. In elitist fashion, however, these 
technocrats believe they know the way forward without the need for society’s 
input. They also employ past strategies, such as the exploitation of natural 
resources and import substitution industrialization. The revenues from resource 
extractions have been used to alleviate poverty. Since Correa’s election in 2006, 
the minimum wage has increased from $170 to $354 per month, as of January 
2015.113 The administration has also continued to provide subsidies for utilities 
and gasoline, and has funded the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Human 
Development Bonus), which provides cash transfers to improve the good living of 
mothers, the elderly, and those with disabilities who fall under 40% of the income 
distribution.114 The amount of cash transferred increased to $35 in 2007 and to 
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$50 in 2012.115 These redistribution polices have generated an environment in 
which the recipients of benefits (estimated at $2 million per month)116 feel 
obligated to reciprocate support to Correa during elections. 
The oil boom that Ecuador experienced from 2007 through 2014 facilitated 
the president’s ability to employ his post-neoliberal initiatives. Social spending 
increased and policies were implemented or revamped to better target poverty 
and inequality reduction. The increased standard of living also solidified support 
for the Correa regime. Although multiple events demonstrate the willingness of 
the administration to attack the freedom of the press and persecute certain social 
groups, most of the population, particularly those who receive government 
benefits, turn a blind eye to the injustices and prefer their elevated economic 
status.117 During Correa’s time as president, he has managed to identify his 
opponents as the other politicians, bankers, private media, and whomever he 
deemed as a corporatist social movement leader.118 He has also succeeded in 
controlling all branches of government and essentially eliminated all institutional 
control and accountability mechanisms that stood in his way. According to de la 
Torre, “His government can do what it wants to cudgel the media, push forward 
with open-pit mining, and silence critical social movements.”119 In all, Correa has 
managed to provide stability and address poverty and inequality; however, his 
approach to limit U.S. influence, eliminate internal political opposition, and 
marginalize social organizations, leads one to believe that Ecuador is still 
experiencing political chaos.  
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D. DRUG POLICIES PRE-CORREA 
Although the country struggled internally, the relationship between 
Ecuador and the United States was on relatively positive terms due to the 
country’s compliance with the U.S. antidrug legislations dating back to the 1980s. 
This directed the “War on Drugs” away from Asia to the Andes region after 
President Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive No. 221 classified drug 
trafficking as a threat to national security, and legitimized the extension of the 
domestic drug policy beyond its borders.120 This redirection toward the Andes 
included massive coca eradication efforts through a mix of repression and 
diplomacy, which was followed by all of Reagan’s successors.121 From the 1980s 
to mid-1990s, the United States favorably funded the supply-side, which focused 
on international interdiction and domestic enforcement, instead of the demand-
side that focuses on public health measures. This global interdiction and 
enforcement effort was taken to new heights in 2000, when President Clinton 
expanded the drug war with the $1.3 billion Plan Colombia.122 This initiative 
aggressively sought to eliminate the drug industry within Colombia and provided 
monumental financial support to assist with the cause. Funding also increased as 
armed groups such as the FARC and the National Liberation Army were deemed 
terrorist organizations after the September 11 attacks.123 Specifically, Plan 
Colombia provided antidrug training, sophisticated equipment, and defoliated 
75,000 acres of coca in two months of operation.124 Similar to other efforts, the 
balloon effect triumphed and pushed cultivation to other locations in the 
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Andes.125 In 2002, the George W. Bush administration further exaggerated this 
effect by proclaiming their plan to cut drug abuse by 25% through more 
aggressive law enforcement.126 According to Alfred McCoy, “At the start of the 
twenty-first century, the United States was fighting the drug war at home by 
creating the world’s largest prison population and abroad by defoliating mountain 
farms in Asia and the Andes.”127 
In terms of Ecuador’s domestic antidrug policies, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
not much attention was placed on security concerns, including the drug trade, 
and the country essentially followed the United States’ lead. At the international 
level, the Ecuadorian government accepted the terms of the 1988 Hague 
Convention against the illicit traffic of narcotics and psychotropic drugs as a 
member of the United Nations.128 During this time frame, the Ecuadorian 
government published two reports that highlighted a presumed growth in illicit 
activities associated with precursor chemicals used to process drugs. The reports 
also alluded that thousands of Ecuadorians were involved and benefitting from 
illicit drug activities.129 Although the report was not based on credible sources or 
derived from sound research methodologies, it did manage to gain mass media 
attention and fuel the perception that the country was facing a serious drug-
trafficking problem. As Ecuador’s presumed role in the drug trade grew, the 
subject began to gain traction in national politics, which resulted in an increase in 
tension between opposing political parties. Specifically, the opposing Social 
Christian Party criticized the then president, Rodrigo Borja Cevallos, who 
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represented the Democratic Left Party, for their relaxed approach against  
drug trafficking.130 
The early 1990s also witnessed an increase in U.S.-sponsored, antidrug 
training for the Ecuadorian police. The training, coupled with the heightened drug 
awareness in domestic politics, created an environment that pushed for tougher 
legislation against drug traffickers. The result was the passage of the 1991 Law 
of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, more commonly known as Law 
108. This patchwork law was hastily derived and included many verbatim 
statutes found in the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic of Narcotics Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances. Furthermore, the law enforced strict penalties on 
those in possession of or trafficking in drugs, which was an about-face from the 
country’s previous drug legislations that focused on drugs as a public  
health issue. 
In the mid-‘90s, the country’s focus shifted away from drug trafficking to its 
southern border with Peru to continue addressing the oldest border dispute in the 
Western Hemisphere over the contested Cordillera del Condor.131 The 
altercation between Ecuador and Peru over the contested area resulted in the 
1995 Cenepa War, which involved the use of over 5,000 troops in a 55-square-
mile area and the loss of an estimated 1,500 military personnel, along with two 
Ecuadorian and nine Peruvian aircraft, totaling an estimated $1 billion in costs 
and resources.132 The government shifted its focus back to drug trafficking after 
Ecuador and Peru signed the 1998 Brasilia Presidential Act, finally resolving  
the dispute. 
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As previously mentioned, in 1999, the Jamil Mahuad administration 
entered into a 10-year agreement with the United States, which granted U.S. 
forces the authority to use the Ecuadorian Air Force Base in Manta. This 
agreement provided U.S. forces with unrestricted access to the installation, and 
served as a critical base to carry out counterdrug detection and monitoring 
operations.133 The United States funded $61.3 million for this effort, which 
included improvements to the runway and existing facilities.134 Due to the FOL’s 
close proximity to Colombia, it played a crucial role in intelligence gathering and 
was fundamentally integrated with the efforts underway via Plan Colombia. 
Ecuador’s involvement in anti-trafficking enforcement drastically shifted with the 
initiation of Plan Colombia, since the problem was viewed as a regional issue. 
Ecuador was expected to help find solutions as a bordering country and because 
drugs and insurgents were said to freely move between the two nations. As a 
result, the country was the recipient of U.S. funds to increase its support for the 
drug war and U.S. regional security strategy.135 
The 2001–2003 Gustavo Noboa administration placed brief strains on the 
U.S.-Ecuadorian relationship due to Noboa’s continued request for aid, despite 
his avid criticism of U.S. policies. The relationship, however, recuperated under 
the Gutierrez administration. In addition to his promise to do away with neoliberal 
reforms, he also campaigned to withdraw from the U.S.-led war on drugs and 
implement the country’s own national security strategy; however, he backpedaled 
once he realized the amount of U.S. funds that were at stake.136 In 2003, the 
U.S.-Ecuadorian relationship reached a high point upon President Gutierrez’s 
visit to Washington, where he declared Ecuador to be the U.S. government’s 
greatest ally.137 Ecuador reached an accord with the U.S. to increase its efforts 
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against drug trafficking and, according to Sandra Edwards, “In exchange for 
funding, equipment and new police stations, Ecuador would implement air 
interdiction and destroy illicit crops and the production of illicit drugs through joint 
military and police operations.”138 According to Edwards and Youngers, 
“Between 1996 and 1999, U.S. aid to Ecuador’s military and police force grew 
from just under $3-million to just under $13-million . . . by 2004, it has increased 
to over $42-million.”139 Furthermore, immediately after President Gutierrez’s visit 
to the United States, the FOL expanded its operations and became the main 
source of monitoring Ecuador’s northern border.140 
E. DRUG POLICIES UNDER THE CORREA ADMINISTRATION 
As promised during his first presidential campaign, upon election, Correa 
confirmed that his administration would push away from its reliance on U.S.-led 
training and assistance, and toward strengthening ties with other armed forces in 
the region to combat drug trafficking.141 Since most of the U.S. support was 
geared toward the War on Drugs, Correa’s focus first centered on the 
nonrenewal of the Manta FOL lease after its expiration in 2009.142 The Manta 
FOL had been an irritant for Correa and, from the onset, the agreement raised 
concerns and caused internal strife between the executive and legislative 
branches of government, since the agreement was kept secret from congress 
during its negotiations. In Ecuador, international agreements required 
congressional approval and the omission of this step resulted in the questioning 
of its constitutionality.143 Concerns were also centered on the security aspects 
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regarding the installation as a target for Colombian insurgents and also as a 
terrorist target, particularly after the U.S. September 11 terrorist attacks. 
Furthermore, Correa’s ill feelings toward the base were magnified after reports 
indicated that the base was used to support the 2008 FARC bombings on 
Ecuadorian territory. 
Ecuadorian drug policies have also tasked the armed forces to support 
counterdrug operations. All branches of the military work with the police, 
customs, the judicial branch, and other governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations to monitor the Peruvian and Colombian borders for illicit activities, 
such as drug trafficking.144 The 2008 FARC bombing on Ecuadorian territory 
caused tension between the two neighboring countries. As a result, the 
Ecuadorian government increased its military presence along the 365-mile 
northern border with Colombia. The total number of soldiers operating in the area 
amounted to 11,000, with an approximate annual cost of $100 million per year.145 
According to the 2014 Latin American Security and Defense Network’s 
Comparative Atlas of Defense, in 2013, the Ecuadorian military deployed 1,760 
personnel to various military detachments, implemented 73 drug-trafficking 
operations, and carried out 3,936 patrols.146 
The ongoing Colombian conflict against the FARC and other armed 
groups caused members of those organizations to infiltrate Ecuador’s northern 
border, using the area as a safe haven for relaxation and operational planning. 
These groups were able to penetrate and operate since the Ecuadorian 
government lacked a presence in the area. To address the impacts of the 
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Colombian conflict in the northern areas of Ecuador, President Correa launched 
Plan Ecuador in 2007. The idea was to attach a military unit to the president that 
could be deployed to provide services in an ungoverned area.147 The focus of 
this plan was to provide security to the population and to address the issues 
arising from poverty, exclusion, and violence that plagued the northern region. 
The plan was granted an executive director; however, it initially failed to gain 
traction due to lack of adequate funding. It was revisited in 2010, and has since 
financed new infrastructure such as schools, roadways, water and sanitation, and 
health care programs.148 Between 2011 and 2012, an estimated $22.5 million 
were sent to various northern populations, with funding expected to increase 
through 2018.149 Although the plan has provided support in various capacities, 
the government is still limited in its ability to implement such programs where it 
has historically not been present.150 
In terms of drug policies before Correa, according to the Transnational 
Institute, an organization that promotes peace, equity and democracy, “Ecuador’s 
drug law was one of the most punitive in the Americas, with very harsh 
sentences for the crime of possession of even a small quantity of drugs.”151 In an 
effort to depart from such a punitive approach, and since his election, Correa has 
implemented a series of reforms aimed at decriminalizing drug use, issuing 
sentences commensurate to the crime, and increasing efforts that focus on 
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health.152 Government policies prior to Correa promoted a “head count” 
approach, or the mass detention of individuals, to drug interdiction in Ecuador. In 
2005, a $15.7-million bilateral security agreement between Ecuador and the 
United States stipulated such logic by demanding a 10% increase in drug 
seizures and a 12% increase in narco-trafficker detentions.153 As a result, 
Fleetwood and Torres state, “This logic of quantification directs interdiction efforts 
to interventions where large numbers of people can be arrested; in short, toward 
mules instead of middlemen or managers.”154 
Correa’s first step toward such reforms can be traced back to Article 364 
of the 2008 Constitution, which asserts addiction as a public health issue and as 
a noncriminal offense.155 An immediate follow-on occurred in July 2008, with the 
pardon of over 2,000 drug mules convicted under the harsh penalties invoked 
under Law 108.156 Furthermore, an additional estimated 2,500 microtraffickers, 
or small-scale drug dealers, were released by September 2009.157 Law 108 was 
replaced by the Código Orgánico Integral Penal (COIP) in October 2011, and in 
February 2014, the approval of Articles 219–228, addressed the scale of 
punishment based on the amount of drugs in possession. It allowed for the 
decriminalization of drugs, since the new articles established the maximum 
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amount of drugs that an individual could legally carry.158 Furthermore, 
possession under Law 108 would result in a sentence of 12 to 16 years and up to 
25 years for multiple substances, whereas Article 220 of the COIP imposed a 
minimal sentence, ranging from two to six months, for minor cases above the 
legal limit.159 
F. U.S.-ECUADORIAN RELATIONS: A DOWNWARD TREND 
Ecuador’s relationship with the United States was once one of two close 
allies, but since Rafael Correa took office in 2007, it can now best be described 
as “rocky.” The 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States resulted in a shift in 
international security focus away from the Americas and toward Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This shift, coupled with the opposition to neoliberal reform, resulted 
in the proliferation of leftist governments in Latin America, primarily in the Andean 
region; Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in 
Ecuador.160 The election of these individuals marked the beginning of challenges 
against the hegemonic United States. Correa’s anti-American stance is ironic, 
considering his U.S. education, that he leads the only country in South America 
to use the U.S. dollar as its currency, and maintains a strong trade relationship 
with the United States.161 Throughout his tenure, Correa has confronted the 
U.S.’s economic and political power and its influence in the region, which he has 
labeled as “imperialist.”162 
A salient contributor to the strain in this relationship is the closure of the 
U.S. military’s Manta FOL. The United States viewed the nonrenewal of the 
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base’s lease as a public “jab,” especially after the significant investments that it 
made to the FOL. Javier Ponce, the appointed Defense Minister, and an avid 
critic of the U.S. armed forces, stated, “We must get past our legacy of relying 
too much on military relations with the United States, with President Bush 
showing little regard for national borders or sovereignty.”163 The relationship 
between the two countries was making progress during the first Obama 
administration and reached another high point when U.S. Secretary of State 
Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Ecuador in 2010 (see Figure 5). During these 
visits, both countries agreed to forgo ideological differences in favor of continued 
dialog.164 This honeymoon was short-lived and tensions intensified due to 
Ecuador’s compensation demands from Chevron and freedom of speech 
restrictions. 
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Figure 5.  Hillary Clinton and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa 
 
Source: Rory Carrol, “Clinton Talks Tax to Latin America, Saying Rich Must Pay 
Their Share,” The Guardian, June 9, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2010/jun/09/hillary-clinton-latin-america-tour. 
International tensions flared in 2010, after five police officers were killed 
during a demonstration protesting their pay and working conditions, which the 
Correa administration declared an attempted coup. The incident’s coverage by 
the administration’s opposing newspaper, El Universo, included an article that 
criticized the administration’s handling of the protest. In turn, Correa sued the 
newspaper and won a $40 million settlement, along with a three-year prison 
sentence for three executives and the journalist who covered the story.165 Correa 
pardoned the four individuals after intense international pressure and criticism 
from the Organization of American State’s (OAS’s) Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression.166 After his reelection in 2013, his attacks on the media 
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continued, however, when he publicized a new Communications Law, which 
regulates both broadcast and print media. The new law was passed in June 
2013, and provides the government with broad powers to limit free speech and 
requires that all information be vetted by the government for accuracy prior to 
release. The regulatory body created from the law, the Superintendence of 
Information and Communications (Supercom), has embarked on a campaign 
ordering media and journalists to recant or apologize for information it considers 
misleading.167 Within a year of the law’s passage, the Human Rights Watch 
organization registered 67 press threats aimed at journalists, and 18 of those 
were forced corrections.168 Criticism of Ecuador continues from the United States 
and other international actors for its use of criminal charges in response to media 
allegations, which is contrary to the media’s role in a democratic society.169 
The long-lasting legal battle between the U.S. oil corporation, Chevron, 
and the Ecuadorian government is another source of tension between the two 
countries. This 20-year-old case continues to live on as Ecuador relentlessly 
demands compensation for environmental damage done to the eastern part of 
the country. The case was first tried in Ecuador and, in 2011, Chevron was found 
liable for $9.5 billion in damages.170 Ecuador was unable to collect, since 
Chevron did not have any assets in the country; therefore, they were forced to 
file a suit in the U.S. and in other countries where Chevron held assets. In 2013, 
Correa criticized the U.S. oil company and referred to Chevron as “that enemy of 
our country.” He further stated, “We are going to tell Latin America what Chevron 
has done in our country to shirk its responsibility, with that criminal campaign that 
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is waging against Ecuador.”171 That same year, Ecuador launched the worldwide 
“Dirty Hand” boycott against the company. The boycott slogan is a reference to 
Correa’s tradition of dipping his hand into oil waste when he visits various 
contaminated sites throughout the Amazonian rainforest.172 Chevron refuses to 
pay, however, claiming that Ecuador’s own oil company, PetroEcuador, is 
responsible for the contamination. Chevron has also sued Ecuador’s American 
attorney, Steven Donziger, and invoked the Racketeer Influenced and Corruption 
Organizations (RICO) Act, claiming Donziger bribed the Ecuadorian judge in the 
case. The case continues to stifle relations with the United States, as Chevron 
exerts its financial power to prolong the proceedings and as Correa uses the U.S. 
oil company as a symbol of American imperialism.173 
The WikiLeaks revelations also hindered relations and sparked a series of 
back and forth political shots between both countries. Due to the disclosures 
revealing that Correa was aware of police corruption, President Correa declared 
the U.S. Ambassador persona non grata and expelled her from Ecuador. The 
United States then expelled the Ecuadorian ambassador two days later; 
however, the diplomatic relationship was mended in September of 2011 with the 
agreement to resume ambassadorial-level relations.174 The following year, 
Ecuador provided asylum to WikiLeaks founder, Julian Assange, at their London 
embassy, which displeased the United States, since his organization published a 
large amount of classified U.S. information. In 2013, the National Security 
Agency contractor, Edward Snowden, followed suit in requesting asylum in 
Ecuador to evade espionage charges from the release of classified U.S. 
surveillance documents. Correa would not consider the request until Snowden 
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was physically in Ecuador or at one of its embassies. To exert its power on 
Correa, the United States considered the nonrenewal of the Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), which has been in place since 
the early 1990s and contributed to an estimated $429 million in nonoil exports in 
2012.175 Although Snowden was not granted asylum in Ecuador, Correa was 
willing to end the ATPDEA to show its displeasure with U.S. policy.176 Ultimately, 
Ecuador’s position was that it would not accept pressure or be threatened by 
anyone.177 In addition, Correa claimed that the ATPDEA turned into a blackmail 
mechanism and unilaterally resigned from the agreement, allowing it to expire on 
July 31, 2013.178 The incident attained the highest level of political attention, with 
a personal phone call from U.S. Vice President Joe Biden to President Correa 
cordially requesting that he deny Snowden’s request.179 In sum, the back-and-
forth jabs and tension created from the WikiLeaks ordeal did not contribute to the 
overall mending of the relationship between the countries. 
In addition to many other factors that have caused tensions between the 
United States and Ecuador under the Correa administration, recent acts indicate 
the relationship is not improving. Although the United States provided 
counternarcotics operational and logistical support in 2014, Ecuador has 
continued to assume greater responsibility in such operations. In turn, the U.S. 
Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
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Affairs shut down their narcotics technical assistance office in Quito in 
September 2014.180 Furthermore, the Correa administration recently announced 
that it was asking the U.S. Agency for International Development to leave, due to 
accusations that the organization was backing Correa’s opposition.181 In January 
2015, Correa publicly announced that the U.S. embassy had too many U.S. 
military officers assigned to it. Correa said, “There are about 50 . . . what justifies 
that?” He further stated, “Unfortunately, these people have been infiltrated in all 
sectors, which scandalously seemed normal. They flew in the helicopters of the 
Air Force, of the Army. It was normal for foreign soldiers to be flying with our 
soldiers in frontier areas.”182 The Correa administration requested the departure 
of all U.S. military members from the Security Cooperation Office; however, it did 
not include those assigned to the U.S. Military Attaché’s office.183 Most recently, 
the Correa administration proposed significant increases to inheritances and 
capital gains taxes, which sparked a series of middle-class protests that occurred 
on the eve of Pope Francis’s visit to Ecuador in July 2015. The tax proposal was 
withdrawn; however, discontent remains over Correa’s aggressive governing 
style, his austerity measures, and other complaints.184 
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IV. EXPLAINING THE INCREASE IN COCAINE FLOW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapters II and III provided background on Ecuador’s current role in the 
cocaine trade and the country’s political environment in the decade prior to, and 
during, the Correa administration. The research to address Ecuador’s role in the 
cocaine trade highlights that increases in cocaine seizures are better explained 
by a greater flow of cocaine transiting through Ecuador via TCOs operating within 
the country, rather than by the effectiveness of counternarcotics operations 
implemented by the Correa administration. Furthermore, the political environment 
has also set the stage for these organizations to flourish due to steps taken by 
the administration to distance themselves from the United States and recent drug 
law reforms that have been implemented. This chapter discusses the factors that 
drive the increase in cocaine flow by first discussing the common explanations 
that are enabling cocaine trafficking to thrive in corrupt and weak institutions. 
Ecuador’s geographical location is also a common explanation; however, it is not 
discussed further in this chapter since Chapter II provides a lengthy discussion of 
that topic. The following section focuses on other particularities within Ecuador, 
and discusses how the new drug reforms and the elimination of U.S. intervention 
help to further explain the increase in cocaine flow. 
B. COMMON EXPLANATIONS 
1. Corruption 
As discussed in Chapter III, the decade of political instability, between 
1996 and 2006, witnessed multiple acts of corruption that called for the removal 
of various presidents. Although Correa’s presidential campaign vowed to “smack 
down the country’s corrupt elites,”185 his administration has attained high 
corruption rankings, and Correa has also been linked to numerous corruption 
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scandals.186 According to Andreas and Martinez, “Corruption associated with 
illicit trade directly affects the quality of political institutions, drug-related violence 
undermines public security, and these two factors undermine citizens’ trust in 
democracy.”187 They also highlight how corruption, in terms of accountability and 
transparency, has a negative effect in reaching democratic consolidation. 
Furthermore, they assert that those engaged in illicit activities often seek to 
access to, or become part of the state apparatus to manipulate, enforcement of 
laws in their favor.188 
According to Transparency International, a corporate and political 
corruption monitoring organization, Ecuador’s 2014 corruption perception ranking 
was 110 of the 175 countries that were ranked and achieved a score of 33 out of 
100.189 These results place it as the third-most corrupt country in South America, 
behind Venezuela and Paraguay, and on par with the northern triangle countries 
of Central America—Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. The comparison to 
Central America is indeed alarming, considering the challenges that region faces 
and how the security situation has deteriorated there, as crime and violence 
threaten the governments of that region.190 Furthermore, the Heritage 
Foundation, a research and educational think tank, stated in their 2015 Index of 
Economic Freedom for Ecuador that “The government’s anti-corruption agency 
reported in 2013 that cronyism, impunity, excessive discretion, fragmented 
anticorruption policies, lack of correspondence between offenses and sanctions, 
and collusion were among the factors that have favored the persistence of 
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corruption in Ecuador.”191 Although corruption continues in Ecuador, since 2005, 
Ecuador’s freedom of corruption score has improved by 25 points.192 To combat 
corruption, the 2008 constitution founded the Transparency and Social Control 
branch of the government, which is responsible for investigating corruption. In 
2013, this branch launched an anticorruption plan that aims to rid the country of 
corruption by 2017.193 This new branch was necessary since the previous drug 
law, Law 108, called for the prosecution of government officials who impeded any 
ongoing prosecution of an individual charged with corruption; however, the law 
did not criminalize other actions, such as government officials engaged in 
corruption. Although the above efforts have been implemented to curb corruption, 
resource limitations and political pressure contribute to the low corruption 
prosecution rate.194 Regardless of the plan to curb corruption, the low scores 
indicate that corruption can still be found in the current administration. 
Correa’s ties to corruption can be traced to his first presidential race, when 
he announced that government contracts would not be awarded to family 
members. His brother, Fabricio Correa, however, won $167 million in contracts 
for road construction and oil services within Correa’s first two years in office by 
registering his company in Panama.195 President Correa became infuriated when 
the media released the story and claimed that it was a smear tactic targeted at 
his administration. Ultimately, Correa rescinded the contracts once it became 
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clear that they, indeed, existed. This episode resulted in a family feud in which 
President Correa stated that his brother was “unbalanced by greed”196 and, 
consequently, Fabricio divulged further actions of corruption undertaken by the 
president’s inner circle and that Correa’s chief of staff also accepted bribes. 
These allegations of corruption were promised an investigation; however, to date, 
it has not come to fruition.197 
Charges also surfaced that the FARC provided funds, generated by the 
sale of cocaine, to Correa’s first presidential campaign.198 This information came 
from a video that showed Jorge Briceño, then FARC secretariat and its no. 2 
commander, reading a manifesto written by the group’s founding member, 
Manuel Marulanda, prior to his death. The manifesto lamented the Colombian 
Army’s seizure of large amounts of electronic documents resulting from the 
bombing of the FARC base camp along the Ecuadorian border that killed their 
foreign minister, Raul Reyes, along with over 20 insurgents.199 The video further 
shows Briceño stating that their secrets had been compromised, to include their 
financial support to the Correa presidential campaign. After decrypting the Reyes’ 
laptop, the Colombian government confirmed that four documents they found 
supported the allegations. According to Nigel Inkster, the FARC was initially 
unimpressed with Correa; however, as his popularity increased and radical 
rhetoric became intriguing, they provided $400,000 to support his campaign, 
which included $300,000 from other FARC allies.200 The investigation also 
revealed that several key members of his administration actively maintained 
                                            
196 Farah and Simpson, “Ecuador at Risk,” 27. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid., 28. 
199 Adriaan Alsema, “FARC Admits Financing Presidential Campaign of Rafael Correa,” 
Colombia Reports, July 17, 2009, http://colombiareports.com/farc-admit-financing-presidential-
campaign-of-rafael-correa/. 
200 Nagel Inkster, The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of Raul 





contact with FARC insurgents, to include his new minister of national security, 
the deputy minister of national security, and the ambassador to Venezuela. 
Correa denounced the allegations, accused the Colombian government of 
fabrication, and believed the laptop would have never survived the bombing.201 
He also relieved those officials who were determined to have maintained ties with 
the FARC.202 
Identifying recent acts of corruption under the Correa administration is a 
difficult feat, because of his control over the media and heavy-handed techniques 
with journalists or media outlets revealing acts of corruption. An example of such 
an approach occurred when police raided the home of investigative journalist 
Fernando Villavicencio at the direction of Correa’s general counsel. According to 
Villavicencio, the police confiscated documents that contractually tied 
PetroEcuador to PetroChina. The agreement stipulated that Ecuador would sell 
China oil below the market’s price for their consumption in exchange for billions 
of dollars in loans from China. Reuters validated this in its investigation, which 
revealed that only 2% of the oil was shipped to China in 2013, and China profited 
in the billions by selling the remaining percentage at market price to U.S. oil 
companies such as Chevron, Exxon, and Mobile.203 Villavicencio stated that 
“contracts between Ecuadorian and Chinese state oil companies are evidence of 
corruption and hypocrisy by Correa and his administration.”204 Correa sentenced 
Villavicencio to 18 months in prison, fined him $140,000, and imposed a public 
                                            
201 Adriaan Alsema, “FARC Admits Financing Presidential Campaign.” 
202 Farah and Simpson, “Ecuador at Risk,” 28. 
203 Daniel Wiser, “Ecuadorian Journalist: Police Stole Docs Involving Government 






apology.205 Subsequently, the cartoonist Xavier “Bonil” Bonilla published an 
illustration of the raid, resulting in verbal attacks from Correa due to his claim that 
it portrayed false information (see Figure 6). In an interview, Bonilla exclaimed 
the cartoon was based on credible information, but contained exaggerated 
aspects for comic effect; he was, however, eventually ordered to rectify his 
drawing publicly (see Figure 7).206 
Figure 6.  Bonilla’s Illustration of the Raid on Fernando Villavicencio’s 
Home 
 
Source: Sofía Ramírez Fionda, “Periódico El Universo “Rectifica” por Orden del 
Gobierno Ecuatoriano, PanAm Post, February 5, 2014, http://es.panampost.com/ 
sofia-ramirez-fionda/2014/02/05/periodico-el-universo-rectifica-por-orden-del-
gobierno-ecuatoriano/. 
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Figure 7.  Bonilla’s Rectified Illustration 
 
Source: Sofía Ramírez Fionda, “Periódico El Universo “Rectifica” por Orden del 
Gobierno Ecuatoriano, PanAm Post, February 5, 2014, http://es.panampost.com/ 
sofia-ramirez-fionda/2014/02/05/periodico-el-universo-rectifica-por-orden-del-
gobierno-ecuatoriano/. 
The 2015 INCSR report highlights that narcotic-related corruption remains 
a problem and sheds light on two cases within the security police forces. The first 
occurred in September 2014, with the arrest of five police officers charged with 
operating an international trafficking operation. The second event occurred the 
following month, with the arrest of another 13 police officers involved in trafficking 
activities, and with the ensuing investigation further implicating 206 other officers 
who were relieved from duty.207 The previous 2014 INCSR report also highlights 
actions of corrupt police officials. The report cites the case of Esmeraldas’ police 
commander, who was given a six-year prison sentence for supporting the 
Sinaloa Cartel and for his attempt to transport 1.5 tons of cocaine to Mexico.208 
The Ecuadorian national police have implemented anticorruption measures 
within its force that include the authority to dismiss corrupt officers, increased 
internal affairs involvement, and polygraph tests. Unfortunately, in 2012, of the 
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1,100 polygraph tests administered, 50% failed to pass, resulting in their 
dismissal from the police force.209 
Recent news articles also highlight further police corruption and their 
involvement in trafficking activities. In October 2014, an incident occurred that 
involved senior police officers. The case involved a colonel who previously led 
Interpol in Ecuador and three other officers, one of whom was a major, who 
packed shipping containers with drugs for international export. Two other cases 
involved the arrest of seven police officers for their attempts to transport 250 kilos 
of drugs to Europe and for their alleged ties to criminal organizations. 
Furthermore, five officers were arrested for charging a $4,000 passage fee per 
kilo of cocaine sent through Quito’s international airport.210 Most recently, a case 
involved three Ecuadorian police officers travelling from Colombia in a patrol 
vehicle full of drugs. Agents interdicted the three police officers, resulting in a 
firefight among force members and the killing of one suspect and one agent.211 
Acts of corruption in Ecuador, particularly those involving the drug trade, is a 
problem found in both the administration and the police force. Identifying acts of 
corruption within the government is tough, and when it is revealed, the story gets 
minimal attention due to the administration’s control of the media. 
Journalists also fear the repercussions of releasing information that may 
implicate high-ranking government officials. The notion that corruption is 
occurring at the national level reverberates throughout the government’s 
institutions, and the backlog of corruption investigations within all sectors of the 
government sheds light on the fact that it is rampant. As highlighted in the 
narrative above, corruption has also impacted those charged with the task of 
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public security. According to the U.S. Department of State 2013 Human Rights 
report, “Corruption; poor hiring procedures; and insufficient training, supervision, 
and resources impaired National Police effectiveness.”212 The report further 
asserts that police officers suspected of corruption are often transferred to other 
units or shielded from judicial actions.213 These acts of corruption serve as an 
open invitation for TCOs, since they know they can operate with the support of 
those tasked to serve the public. 
2. Weak Institutions 
The issue of corruption occurring within Ecuador, as noted above, 
reverberates throughout the country and impacts other institutions; most notably 
the judicial, financial, and security institutions. Aside from their corruptibility, 
these weak institutions also contribute to criminal activities on their own. 
According to the last five INCSR reports, Ecuador “is . . . vulnerable to 
transnational criminal organized crime due to weak public institutions . . . .”214 
Unfortunately, the INCSR reports, along with other reports, fail to elaborate on 
exactly what “weak public institutions” means in the case of Ecuador. The 
following sections briefly discuss two of the above-mentioned institutions, judicial 
and financial, in further detail. The security institution is not discussed, since its 
weakness is evident based in the information provided above. 
a. The Judicial System 
Ecuador’s judicial system is slow and has lagged in establishing a system 
that operates without political influence. For example, recent reforms have 
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allowed the administration to place its allies in key judicial positions.215 The 
prison system helps illustrate Ecuador’s slow judicial system and how it may 
contribute to an increase in cocaine trafficking. As mentioned in Chapter III, prior 
to the passage of the new criminal code in 2014, the use of a heavy-handed 
approach toward criminalizing drug-related activities resulted in prison 
overcrowding throughout the country. According to Marguerite Cawley, between 
2009 and October 2013, the prison population increased by 122% and was 96% 
over capacity. Furthermore, the percentage of the total prison population awaiting 
trial was 37%.216 The most recent statistics from the World Prison Brief, dated 
September 2014, shows that overcapacity has decreased to 14%; however, 
pretrial detainees have increased by over 10% to 48.8%.217 The decrease in 
overcapacity is not the result of a lower inmate population, as evidenced by 
Ecuador’s 2014 prison rate of 162 per hundred thousand, which has gone up 
significantly since the prison rate of 79 per hundred thousand in 2010. While the 
decrease in overcrowding is attributed to the establishment of new and 
refurbishment of old prison centers throughout the country, the prison population 
continues to increase. Although the new centers may improve conditions, the 
increase in remand detention illustrates that judicial proceedings continue to lag. 
Another aspect that may be causing the increase in detention rates is the 
justice system’s inability to effectively investigate crimes. According to the 2015 
Rule of Law Index, generated by the World Justice Project, on a scale from 0 to 
1, Ecuador scored 0.40 in effective investigations and 0.38 in timely and effective 
adjudications.218 Under the previous drug law, Law 108, preventive detention 
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associated with drug charges was widely accepted, and once detention was 
granted, a person could be held indefinitely. The increase in pretrial detentions 
further shows the practice continues to be a problem. 
Drawing on the experiences in Central America is not a direct parallel; 
however, those retained in detention, according to Sandra Edwards, are mostly 
made up of problematic drug users and those from the poorer sectors of society, 
become further exposed to criminal activities and continue their behavior due to 
weak rehabilitation programs.219 The Ecuadorian government is aware of their 
rehabilitation shortfall and vowed to take control over private rehabilitation 
centers and create publicly funded centers throughout the country by 2015. 
Currently, the Ecuadorian government operates 15 publicly funded rehabilitation 
centers and, as of September 2015, only two are dedicated to drug 
rehabilitation—one operating in Quito and the other in Guayaquil. Furthermore, 
the country has over a hundred private centers that are costly and unaffordable 
to the poor, often requiring those in need to obtain loans to receive care.220 The 
lack of rehabilitation opportunities, coupled with the exposure to hardened and 
connected criminals, can lead inmates or detainees, specifically the poorer ones, 
to turn or return to criminal activity upon their release, thus providing trafficking 
organizations with individuals to fulfill their operations at the ground level. The 
increased levels in microtrafficking, discussed in more detail in Section C, further 
solidify this point. 
To address a system plagued by inefficiency and political influence, in 
2011 the Correa administration began judicial reforms to address such problems. 
His plan included the appointment of judges to the two highest judicial bodies: 
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the 21-member National Court, along with a 9-member constitutional court.221 
Members of the opposition, along with international experts, voiced their 
concerns about the appointment process used to fill the seats in the two courts. 
They felt that the process lacked transparency and that the selection committee 
responsible was too closely aligned with the Correa administration.222 The 
reforms resulted in the removal of hundreds of judges and the methods used to 
remove them raised questions about the independence of the judicial system. 
From an individual judge’s perspective, independence means that judges are 
under no pressure to rule in a certain way. Furthermore, independence can only 
occur when the judge is not under the control of someone who has a stake in the 
issue that requires a judgment. Consequently, in their 2014 report, the Due 
Process of Law (DPLF) foundation, in conjunction with Dejusticia and the Legal 
Defense Institute, a partnership dedicated to strengthening rule of law and 
human rights in Latin America, published multiple cases in which the government 
exerted its influence on the judicial system when the administration’s interests 
were at stake. The actions are clearly indicative of judicial independence 
violations.223 When the judicial system lacks independence, issues such as 
abuse of power or violations of human rights rarely result in convictions. When 
convictions are reached, they are done so only in exceptional cases. According 
to Roberto Laver, “Among all of the weaknesses of a developing country’s 
judiciaries, a lack of judicial independence is among the most serious because it 
infringes on the ability of judiciaries to carry out their primary responsibilities.”224 
Laver then goes on to list such responsibilities; however, the most relevant to this 
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project is “deterrence of crime.” A weak judiciary facilitates criminal actions due 
to their inability to successfully prosecute crime, which, in turn, leads to impunity 
that favors the criminal organizations operating in the country. In Ecuador, 
although the events discussed in the 2014 report by the DPLF did not involve 
drugs, they serve to highlight the administration’s willingness to intervene in the 
judicial realm. International or local criminal organizations and gangs, who are 
known for their ability to penetrate institutions and influence government officials, 
can exploit the judiciary system to facilitate a low-risk environment for  
their operations. 
b. The Financial System 
Continuing the discussion of weak institutions, we now turn to Ecuador’s 
financial system to show how dollarization and money laundering makes Ecuador 
an ideal setting for criminal activity. In 2000, Ecuador converted from the Sucre 
to the dollar as their legal tender after the failure of economic reforms resulted in 
the deep recession of 1999. In the 1990s, Ecuador failed to open their economy 
to international trade and capital markets. The country witnessed large fiscal 
deficits, along with high external debt, magnified by low oil prices and the 
catastrophic impacts that El Nino weather patterns had on agricultural 
production.225 According to Quispe-Agnoli and Whisler, “These external shocks 
resulted in low economic growth, inflation, and liquidity problems in an already 
fragile banking sector.”226 They further asserted that, “Several developments 
contributed to Ecuador’s economic collapse in 1999: the devaluation of the Sucre 
in February, a freeze on bank deposits in March, a default on external debt 
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payments in September, and the country’s overall political uncertainty and lack of 
policy direction.”227 
Ecuador is currently the only South American country to use the U.S. 
dollar as their legal tender; however, in Central America, Panama and El 
Salvador also use the dollar as their currency. According to a 2014 White House 
report, “Drug users in the United States spend on the order of $100 billion 
annually on cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and meth.”228 Furthermore, the United 
States is also the largest consumer of cocaine in the world.229 In addition, the 
U.S. dollar is also the most commonly used currency in the world.230 Considering 
Ecuador’s currency and its location at the center of the most prolific cocaine-
producing region of the world, framed together with the above-mentioned 
statistics, it is no wonder why drug-trafficking organizations and gangs seek to 
operate out of Ecuador. The use of the dollar in Ecuador makes trafficking drugs 
much easier in two key ways. First, it makes transactions easier since it 
eliminates the additional step to convert currency; therefore, large amounts of 
drug-generated dollars do not stand out from the local currency. Second, it 
facilitates money-laundering activities. According to Miriam Wells, “some $3 
billion, or four percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), were 
allegedly laundered in Ecuador in 2011.”231 According to Hirst, “Ecuador is 
allegedly an increasingly important money laundering hub for a variety of non-
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state and rogue actions, due to its dollarized economy.”232 Strong banking 
secrecy laws and lenient restrictions in transferring money has also historically 
amplified money-laundering activities in Ecuador.233 On a positive note, in 
October 2015, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international group 
responsible for setting anti-money-laundering standards, removed Ecuador from 
their blacklist since they made significant process in addressing anti-money-
laundering shortfalls.234 In 2013, Ecuador was the only South American country 
to remain on the FATF’s blacklist with countries like Syria and Pakistan, due to 
deficiencies in their anti-money-laundering system.235 Despite Ecuador’s efforts 
to curb money-laundering activities, the dollarization of the country’s economy 
has facilitated such activities, making it significantly more appealing for TCOs, 
and thus further helping to explain the increases in the flow of cocaine throughout 
Ecuador. 
C. EXPLANATIONS SPECIFIC TO ECUADOR 
1. The New Drug Law Reforms and the Growth of Microtrafficking 
As discussed in Chapter III, Articles 219-228 of Ecuador’s new COIP 
became law in February 2014. The change in the law also coincides with the 
increases in cocaine seizures that reached a five-year high of 61.3 tons in 2014; 
primarily of cocaine, but also other drugs. As of mid-2015, statistics show that 
seizures were on target to reach the 100-ton mark and eclipse the 10-year high 
set in 2009. The link between the new drug law and the increase in cocaine flow 
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can be found in the elevated growth of microtrafficking. In essence, the drug law 
decriminalized the possession of small amounts of drugs and established more 
rational penalties.236 Furthermore, the intent of the drug law reforms was to 
assert addiction as a public health issue, rather than as a criminal offense. 
Therefore, those caught with drugs could be taken to a rehabilitation center 
instead of prison.237 This dynamic creates a less-threatening environment for the 
small-scale drug peddler at the local level, and provides the big-time trafficker 
with a pool of individuals willing to take the higher-stake risks. 
Coincidentally, the domestic distribution of drugs concerns the 
government, considering the amount of seizures being conducted at the local 
scale. In early 2015, a seizure of 13.3 tons of cocaine revealed that 3.4 tons were 
destined for Ecuador’s micro-trafficking networks. Furthermore, in the first few 
months of 2015, the Ecuadorian police discovered 52 organizations dedicated to 
microtrafficking.238 A report written by two researchers from La Facultad 
LatinoAmericana de Ciencias Sociales—Fredy Rivera and Daniel Potón, indicate 
that those who distribute cocaine to the domestic market also capitalize on 
established routes used to get cocaine to ports for export.239 As mentioned in 
Chapter II, Colombian and Mexican cartels control the many routes that traverse 
Ecuadorian territory. These cartels recruit Ecuadorians as the labor force to help 
facilitate their illicit operations. Ricardo Camacho, in an interview with InSight 
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Crime, stated, “The Ecuadorians are the ones driving the trucks, loading the 
containers, and guarding the drug shipments.”240 Many of these organizations 
associated with micro-trafficking are composed of familial clans, while others are 
local and foreign gangs.241 One of the main cartels operating in Ecuador, the 
Mexican Sinaloa Cartel, is known to pay their local networks in cocaine instead of 
cash. As such, the increase in drug exports is commonly followed by an increase 
in local micro-trafficking efforts, since the cocaine received as payment floods the 
domestic markets.242 
The growth of microtrafficking has impacted several cities throughout the 
country. The most notably affected is the country’s capital, Quito, where the local 
drug market is fed by drug shipments traveling through the northern provinces of 
Sucumbíos and Esmeraldas, on the Colombian border. The central city of 
Ambato is also deeply affected and, according to police reports, eight local 
organizations are known to operate in the area. On the coast, the city of Manta, 
which was once the home of a U.S. FOL, has identified four hubs dedicated to 
microtrafficking.243 The local operations are lucrative for those involved, as it is 
believed that neighborhoods in Quito generate an estimated $200,000 to 
$400,000 per month from micro-trafficking.244 Before to the loss of key members, 
the La Cordillera gang from Colombia was estimated to earn $20,000 per day in 
Quito’s local drug trade.245 
                                            
240 Pachico, “Is the Sinaloa Cartel Feeding Ecuador’s Domestic Drug Trade?”  
241 “Policía identifica familias vendedoras de drogas,” [Police Identify Drug Selling Families] 
El Telegrafo, November 20, 2013, http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/justicia/item/policia-identifica-
familias-vendedoras-de-drogas.html. 
242 Natalie Southwick, “Are Crime Families Fueling Rise in Ecuador Domestic Drug Trade?” 
InSight Crime, November 20, 2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/family-clans-
increasingly-involved-in-ecuadors-drug-trade. 
243 Pachico, “Is the Sinaloa Cartel Feeding Ecuador’s Domestic Drug Trade?” 
244 Ibid. 
245 Southwick, “Are Crime Families Fueling Rise in Ecuador Domestic Drug Trade?” 
74 
 
Consequently, in September 2015, President Correa convened his 
assembly to quickly approve reforms for the newly approved COIP in an effort to 
increase penalties for micro traffickers.246 Correa claimed that micro traffickers 
were obtaining “impunity,” as well as “poisoning the population.”247 This action 
was a reversal to his rhetoric of the previous year that avidly criticized the heavy-
handed approach toward drugs and advocated the need to lessen penalties for 
drug possession. According to Correa, “the government seeks to harden the 
scales and penalties on the illicit traffic of drugs.”248 He further asserted that “we 
will completely rectify the tables to obtain a zero tolerance drug policy.”249 
Changes were applied to all commonly used substances; however, heroin and 
cocaine saw the most dramatic of changes. The 2014 table used to differentiate 
between the small-, medium-, high-, and large-scale of illicit traffic of narcotics 
allowed a person to possess a maximum of 50 grams of cocaine and still fall 
under the small scale (see Table 1).250 The 2015 table pushed by Correa 
drastically reduced the small-scale possession to two grams (see Table 2).251 
Furthermore, those who are caught and deemed to fall within the small scale are 
only sentenced to two to six months in prison.252 These light sentences serve as 
virtual impunity, since preventive detention does not apply to sentences of less 
than one year. Therefore, micro traffickers seize opportunities to skip their 
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hearings, serve their sentence, and continue dealing.253 In all, Correa’s return to 
the heavy-hand approach, due to heightened levels of microtrafficking activity 
and fueled by the trafficking organizations operating within the country, supports 
the idea that the new drug law passed in early 2014 created a less-threatening 
environment to sell drugs, which contributed to the increase in cocaine flow 
within Ecuador. 
Table 1.   July 2014 Narcotics Table for Sanctioning Illicit Trafficking on 
a Small, Medium, and Large Scale 
Source: Jorge Vicente Paladines Rodriguez, “Nuevas Penas para Delitos de 
Drogas en Ecuador: “Duros Contra los Débiles y Débiles Contra los Duros: La 
Lección no Aprendida,” [New Penalties for Drug Crimes in Ecuador: “Hard 
against the Weak and Weak against the Strong: Lessons Not Learned] The 
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Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. 
Minimum 0 1 0 50 0 50 0 300 
Medium 1 5 50 500 50 2,000 300 2,000 
High 5 20 500 2,000 2,000 5,000 2,000 10,000 
Grand Scale 20 and above 2,000 and above 5,000 and above 10,000 and above 
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Table 2.   September 2015 Narcotics Table for Sanctioning Illicit 
Trafficking on a Small, Medium, and Large Scale 
Source: Jorge Vicente Paladines Rodriguez, “Nuevas Penas para Delitos de 
Drogas en Ecuador: “Duros Contra los Débiles y Débiles Contra los Duros: La 
Lección no Aprendida,” [New Penalties for Drug Crimes in Ecuador: “Hard 
Against the Weak and Weak Against the Strong: Lessons Not Learned] The 
Transnational Institute, October 8, 2015, https://www.tni.org/es/art%C3%ADculo/ 
nuevas-penas-para-delitos-de-drogas-en-ecuador-duros-contra-los-debiles-y-
debiles-contra. 
2. Reduced U.S. Counternarcotics Involvement 
The narrative in Section F of Chapter III highlights the growing tension in 
U.S.-Ecuador relations and sheds light on the diminished role of U.S. 
counternarcotics involvement. To briefly recap Chapter II, the events contributing 
to the United States’ reduced counterdrug presence began with the closure of the 
Manta FOL in 2009, followed by the closure of the U.S. Security Cooperation 
Office in 2014, and culminated with the closure of the Department of State’s 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affair’s (INL) Technical 
Assistance Office in 2014. This section further demonstrates how the reduction of 
U.S. involvement in counternarcotics efforts within Ecuador also creates a low-
threat environment in which trafficking organizations and gangs are able  
to operate. 
As with the drug law reforms discussed above, the closure of the two latter 
entities also coincided with the heightened amount of cocaine seizures in the last 
two years. The same pattern held with the closure of the FOL. In 2009, the year 
that the FOL closed, drug seizures totaled 68.05 tons, resulting in a 10-year high. 








Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. 
Minimum 0 0.1 0 2 0 1 0 20 
Medium 0.1 0.2 2 50 1 50 20 300 
High 0.2 20 50 2,000 50 5,000 300 10,000 
Grand Scale 20 and above 2,000 and above 5,000 and above 10,000 and above 
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According to Andrew Yeo, “Washington noted that missions involving the Manta 
FOL in the Eastern Pacific and Andean mountains significantly contributed to 
U.S. counter drug strategic policies in Latin America.”254 Considering the 
importance of the FOL and its impact on counterdrug efforts, the high rate of 
cocaine seizures can also be explained by the reduced threat of trafficking due to 
the FOL’s drawdown. Seizures plunged significantly in the following year; 
however, they subsequently continued to grow each year thereafter toward the 
levels we see today. In the years following the FOL’s closure; however, Ecuador 
did manage to obtain the title of the “UN of organized crime”255 due to the influx 
of TCOs operating from the country. 
In early 2014, President Correa publicly denounced the presence of the 
estimated 50 U.S. military members in the embassy Military Group, claiming the 
number to be “scandalously high” and that it would not be allowed.256 
Furthermore, Ecuador’s decision to reduce the number of U.S. military personnel 
was based on their position that the country had adequately increased its 
capacities and resources to assume an independent approach toward its defense 
and security. The government touted their 2013 seizure rates for narcotics and 
illegally laundered funds and that their investments in security surpassed all Latin 
American countries.257 Based on the administration’s return to a heavy-handed 
approach, resulting from the increase in microtrafficking, these assessments are 
erroneous. As a result, the Security Cooperation Office that operated at the U.S. 
embassy in Quito closed its doors on April 30, 2014. The Department of State 
                                            
254 Andrew Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 89.  
255 Pachico, “Ecuador the ‘UN of Crime.’” 
256 “Gobierno dice Relación de Seguridad con EE.UU. Debe Regirse por el Respeto Mutuo,” 
[Government Says U.S. Security Relationship Should be Governed by Mutual Respect]  
El Comercio, accessed December 28, 2015, http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/seguridad/ 
gobierno-dice-relacion-de-seguridad.html.  
257 “Statement from the Embassy of Ecuador to the United States Regarding Agreement to 
Scale Back U.S. Military Presence in Ecuador,” Embassy of Ecuador in the United States, 
accessed January 12, 2016, http://www.ecuador.org/blog/?p=3756. 
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respected the host nation’s decision and released a statement stating that 
military cooperation between the two countries “has resulted in significant 
advances against drug trafficking . . . and other transnational crime.”258 At the 
time of its closure, the SCO managed 12 Ecuadorian-approved programs that 
ranged from training to procurement to humanitarian assistance.259 
Consequently, some of the programs targeted the reduction of illicit trade along 
the coast and along both the southern and northern borders.260 The programs 
were then transferred to Ecuador for their evaluation and potential financing, if 
deemed necessary.261 
On the heels of the SCO’s closure, William Brownfield, the U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State and head of the INL, announced in May 2014 that Ecuador’s 
INL office would close the following September. According to the Department of 
State, the INL “works to keep Americans safe at home by countering international 
crime, illegal drugs, and instability abroad.”262 According to Charles Parkinson, 
the withdrawal further widened the gaps in the region’s antidrug operations.263 
His comment is based on the notion that Ecuador became the third country, 
behind Bolivia and Venezuela, to remove the U.S. counternarcotic presence and 
influence, of which all three are key trafficking hubs. In all, the removal of these 
two key entities severely affected the United States’ counternarcotics influence in 
                                            
258 Eric Auner, “Fraying Relationship with Ecuador a Blow to U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts,” 
World Politics Review, May 23, 2014, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-
lines/13805/fraying-relationship-with-ecuador-a-blow-to-u-s-counternarcotics-efforts. 
259 “Security Cooperation Office,” Embassy of the United States in Ecuador, accessed 
January 13, 2016, http://ecuador.usembassy.gov/policy/the-united-states-military-group---
usmilgrp.html. 
260 Ibid. 
261 “Statement from the Embassy of Ecuador.” 
262 “Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,” U.S. Department of 
State, accessed January 13, 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/. 
263 Charles Parkinson, “Withdrawal from Ecuador Creates Latest Hole in U.S. Anti-Drug 




the country and left subsequent efforts in the hands of the host government, 
further creating a low-threat environment for traffickers to conduct business. 
In addition to the lack of U.S. counternarcotics influence contributing to a 
low-threat trafficking environment, the strained political relations between the two 
countries also further exacerbates the increase in Ecuador’s cocaine flow. In 
Section Three of the White House’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Crime: 
Addressing Converging Threats to National Security, in which it outlines U.S. 
strategy to combat transnational organized crime, the word “sophisticated” is 
used to describe TCOs three times.264 The White House is not alone in their 
characterization of TCOs, as numerous other reports and organizations use the 
same or similar verbiage. According to Marvelli and Finckenauer, “Sophistication 
. . . involves the degree of preparation and planning for the crime and how much 
skill and knowledge are needed in order to commit the crime.”265 The point 
regarding their sophistication is to posit that TCOs understand the political 
environments where they hope operate. Ecuador’s political environment, its drug 
law reforms, its anti-U.S. stance, and its removal of vital antidrug efforts, 
presented an opportunity for TCOs to exploit, which this research asserts that 
they did, and did well. The result is a low-threat environment in which TCOs are 
able to operate. 
  
                                            
264 Strategy to Combat Transnational Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to national 
Security, (Washington, DC: The White House, 2011), 13, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/microsites/2011-strategy-combat-transnational-organized-crime.pdf. 
265 David A Marvelli and James O. Finckenauer, “The Threat of Harm by Transnational 
Organized Crime: A U.S. Perspective, in Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime, 
ed. by Felia Allum and Stan Filmour (New York: Routledge, 2012), 509. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
1. The Ecuadorian Drug Trade 
The debate is ongoing as to whether the recent number of cocaine 
seizures indicates that more cocaine is flooding the country, or if the country’s 
antinarcotics efforts are simply more effective. With the increase in TCOs 
operating in Ecuador, the former reflects a more accurate picture, which helps 
support the first hypothesis presented in this paper. The Mexican cartels have 
pushed their way down the cocaine supply chain, through Central America, 
toward the production end in the Andean region. Within the last five years, their 
presence in Ecuador has continued to grow and, although violence has not 
escalated to the levels witnessed in Mexico, Central America, or Colombia, it 
could easily increase, as criminal organizations from all over the world seek to 
dominate Ecuador’s trafficking routes. 
Chapter I attempted to describe where the country stands in terms of the 
cocaine supply chain. As expected and repeatedly mentioned, Ecuador is not a 
major coca producer; however, it is a major transit hub for cocaine distribution 
worldwide. Current events reveal that the cocaine entering from the northern and 
southern borders is destined for Ecuador’s coast for maritime trafficking. The 
most popular methods of export include speed boats, barges, semisubmersibles, 
submersibles, and container shipments. As Ecuadorian hired-hands assist the 
cartels to move their merchandise, organizations such as the Sinaloa Cartel pay 
them in drugs, which, in turn, fuel the country’s profitable, local, microtrafficking 
networks. In sum, cocaine seizures are escalating, the number of processing 




2. U.S.-Ecuadorian Relations 
In 2006, Rafael Correa emerged victorious as Ecuador’s president on the 
promise to end the political corruption and ineptitude that occurred in the decade 
prior to his election, and to distance the country from Western-driven economic 
reforms and influence. While Correa has successfully accomplished what he set 
out to do, he has also managed to create an internal political arena where he 
holds all political power and has suppressed opponents, such as the media and 
social organizations. Chapter II discussed the political environment within 
Ecuador and the significant number of events that have strained relations 
between Ecuador and the United States. Upon his election, he closed the Manta 
FOL, assumed a greater role in the country’s own counternarcotics operations, 
closed the U.S. Security Cooperation office, expelled U.S. officials, and 
essentially decriminalized drug possession under the country’s new drug law. 
3. Explanations and Findings 
Addressing the above two topics is necessary in order to adequately 
respond to the research questions driving this thesis project, while also 
supporting the second hypothesis that posits that the political environment, 
coupled with the removal of U.S. counternarcotics influence, creates a low-threat 
environment for criminal organizations to operate in, thus resulting in increased 
cocaine flow through Ecuador. Chapter IV first discussed corruption and weak 
institutions as common reasons that help explain why cocaine flow is increasing 
within Ecuador. The chapter then turned its focus to more specific explanations 
within Ecuador. 
In terms of corruption, as of 2014, a corruption perception index ranked 
Ecuador as the third-most corrupt country in South America. Instances of 
corruption have been linked to President Correa, as in the case when the FARC 
provided funds to support Correa’s first presidential campaign. Another example 
includes the award of government contracts to his brother, despite Correa’s 
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promise to not award contracts to family members. In cases where corruption 
scandals are exposed, the government has responded in a tough manner against 
journalists responsible for the story and taken retaliatory actions against them 
including incarceration, monetary fines, orders to rectify the story, and requiring 
public apologies. Furthermore, multiple examples exist that demonstrate how 
narcotics-related corruption is a problem within the Ecuadorian police force. This 
environment openly invites criminal organizations, since they understand that 
those tasked to serve the public may be mostly interested in serving themselves. 
Weak institutions also contribute to criminal activities and Chapter III 
specifically addresses the judicial and financial systems. Ecuador’s judicial 
system is slow, as evidenced by the increase in pretrial detention rates, and is 
subject to political interference due to the administration placing its allies in key 
judicial positions. The justice system’s inability to investigate crimes is also a 
concern, since many of those held in detention are habitual drug users or from 
the poor sectors of society. While in detention, these individuals are further 
exposed to criminal activities and are also not offered an effective rehabilitation 
program. As a result, these individuals may become a hiring pool for trafficking 
organizations upon their release due to their limited options. The recent 
escalation of microtrafficking further helps to validate this point. Furthermore, the 
lack of judicial independence inhibits the judiciary’s ability to carry out its primary 
responsibilities, one of which is to deter crime. In turn, this facilitates criminal 
actions and can lead to impunity, which favors the criminal organizations 
operating within the country. To summarize Ecuador’s financial system, the 
country’s adoption of the U.S. dollar as the legal tender and its reputation for 
laundering money make Ecuador an ideal setting for criminal activity. 
The 2014 drug reform essentially decriminalized the possession of small 
amounts of drugs and relaxed penalties. Coincidently, in 2014, when the new 
drug law was passed, the country also reached its five-year high in cocaine 
seizures. In essence, the relaxed laws resulted in heightened levels of 
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microtrafficking. Organizations dedicated to microtrafficking increased and have 
utilized established drug routes used to export cocaine out of the country. Many 
of these routes are controlled by major organizations such as the Sinaloa Cartel, 
which uses the local population to conduct the ground-level logistics. 
Furthermore, these cartels pay, or reward, their foot soldiers in drug product, 
which is then sold to their local populations. Reports indicate that microtrafficking 
is expanding due to its profitability in major cities that are now becoming key 
hubs. Interestingly, President Correa recognized that his 2014 reforms were the 
cause of the increased seizures by creating an environment of impunity and, 
therefore, stiffened the laws in late 2015. Correa’s change to a zero-tolerance 
approach supports that his 2014 reforms created a less-threatening environment 
for drug traffickers operating at all scales and thus contributed to the increase in 
cocaine flow. 
In addition to the 2014 drug law, the reduction of the U.S. presence and its 
counternarcotic involvement in Ecuador also help explain the increase in the 
country’s drug flow. In early 2014, President Correa publicly criticized the number 
of U.S. military members present at the U.S. embassy in Quito, and the following 
April, the SCO closed its doors. The counternarcotics programs spearheaded by 
the SCO, which were intended to reduce illicit trade in areas throughout the 
country, were either terminated or transferred to the Ecuadorian military. Soon 
after, the INL, another major counternarcotics player, ceased its operations. The 
removal of these two organizations severely impacted the United States’ 
counternarcotics influence in Ecuador. Furthermore, these instances 
compounded the already tenuous relationship between the two countries. With 
the United States out of the counternarcotics picture, sophisticated criminal 
organizations, who understand the political environment, are aware of Ecuador’s 
relaxed drug reforms, and are tuned-in to the country’s anti-U.S. rhetoric, 
understand that Ecuador is a low-threat environment for drug trafficking and, 
therefore, flood the country with cocaine. Figure 8 provides a summation of the 
findings from this thesis. 
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1. Prioritize Rebuilding Trust and Influence in Ecuador 
Despite the tenuous relations, the United States should prioritize 
rebuilding trust and influence in Ecuador. The tide in Ecuador may turn with 
Correa’s presidential term ending in 2017. Furthermore, the anti-Correa protests 
that rocked the country in late 2015, and the resurgence of the right-of-center 
governments in the region, are also signs that change may come. The United 
States must, therefore, be ready to support such a change, improve its 
relationship with Ecuador, and seek opportunities to exert its influence there. In 
spite of strained relations, positive signs of support are seen from both the 
Department of State and Defense. As of July 2015, the Department of State has 
continued to provide support for Ecuador aimed at strengthening rule of law, 
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security, countertrafficking, academia, and climate change; however, such 
support remains limited.266 Regarding the Department of Defense, General John 
F. Kelly, Commander of the United States Southern Command, in his 2015 
United States Southern Command Posture Statement, recognized Ecuador’s 
decision to eliminate the U.S. military presence in Ecuador and stated, “Despite 
such complex and evolving regional dynamics . . . U.S. Southern Command is 
ready and willing to partner with all regional militaries on issues like respect for 
human rights, disaster response, and illicit trafficking.”267 
Ecuador’s participation in UNITAS Pacific 2015 is a great example of how 
the United States can continue to build trust and influence. This scenario-based 
exercise included navies from around the world to test command and control, 
and to promote interoperability and cooperation among partner nations.268 To 
ensure that Ecuador does not turn into the next narco-state, U.S. policy makers 
must continue to find creative ways to build trust and promote efforts that 
strengthen the country’s ability to counter its drug flow. Fortunately, the United 
States has a cooperative relationship with both of Ecuador’s bordering 
countries—Colombia and Peru. As a result, U.S. policy makers should enhance 
counterdrug support targeted to Colombia’s southern and Peru’s northern border, 
which indirectly support Ecuador. 
2. Andean Region Intelligence Fusion Center 
To further augment support in the border areas, Ecuador, Peru, and 
Colombia should expand regional cooperation through the implementation of an 
Andean region intelligence fusion center. As a major transit hub for cocaine 
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destined to worldwide markets and because most of the cocaine trafficked 
through Ecuador originates in either Colombia or Peru, interagency intelligence 
cooperation through a regional fusion center can help bring drug trafficking in the 
area under control. A fusion center is formally defined as, a “collaborative effort 
of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the 
center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and 
respond to criminal and terrorist activity.”269 Fusion centers emerged in the 
United States after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center to improve 
communications between local, state, and federal agencies, and the private 
sector. Over the last 15 years, these centers have evolved into the National 
Network of Fusion Centers, whose mission is to analyze threat information and 
intelligence to protect the nation from criminal activity and terrorism.270 Recent 
research conducted by Thomas Bruneau proposed the implementation of fusion 
centers in Central America to “serve as a forcing mechanism to encourage 
different elements of the security apparatus in the region . . .  to bring the illegal 
actors, including [transnational organized crime] TOC and street gangs, under 
some semblance of control.”271 This same logic can be applied to the Andean 
region to assist in controlling the illicit trafficking activities that plague the area. 
                                            
269 Information Sharing: Federal Agencies are Helping Fusion Centers Build and Sustain 
Capabilities and Protect Privacy, but Could Better Measure Results, (GAO-10-972) (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010), 1, http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/310268.pdf. 
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